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NOTE
CAUGHT IN A RUNDOWN: THE NEED FOR A
ZERO-TOLERANCE DRUG POLICY TO BRING
INTEGRITY BACK INTO PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
AND STOP THE SPREAD OF PERFORMANCE
ENHANCING DRUGS INTO SOCIETY
I.

INTRODUCTION

These players will do everything to get into baseball and anything
to stay in baseball.
- Bob Costas, Baseball: The Tenth Inning'
Many young athletes in high schools, colleges, and the minor
leagues possess a relentless competitive mentality.' These young athletes
will do "everything"--even use performance-enhancing. drugs
("PEDs") 3-to
make it to the professional sports leagues ("The
Leagues"). This competitive mentality is largely influenced by
professional players seeking to remain relevant in their respective
sports,' doing "anything" to stay active in The Leagues.6 There are many
1. BASEBALL: THE TENTH INNING (PBS 2010).

2. See Ryan Calfee & Paul Fadale, Popular Ergogenic Drugs and Supplements in Young
Athletes, 117 PEDIATRICS e577, e578 (2006) (explaining the growing use of PEDs among young
athletes).
3. Performance-EnhancingDrugs, DRUG FREE SPORT, http://www.drugfreesport.com/drugresources/performance-enhancing-drugs-steroids.asp (last visited Feb. 15, 2015) ("A performanceenhancing drug is any substance taken by athletes to improve performance. This term is referenced
often and typically refers to anabolic steroid use in sports by professional and amateur athletes.
Other substances may also be taken to improve performance, including human growth hormone
(hGH), stimulants and diuretics.").
4. See BASEBALL: THE TENTH INNING, supra note 1. For the purposes of this Note,
professional sports leagues will collectively refer to: Major League Baseball ("MLB"); National
Football League ("NFL"); National Basketball Association ("NBA"); and National Hockey League
("NHL").
5. See Lynn Zinser & Serge F. Kovaleski, Another Player Receives 50-Game Ban, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 23, 2012, at B1O (reporting that Bartolo Colon, a thirty-nine year old pitcher, who
pitched in only forty-three games from 2006-2009 was suspended for PED use).
6. See BASEBALL: THE TENTH INNING, supranote 1.
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reasons why PED use is so widespread in The Leagues-including the
highly competitive nature of athletes, 7 and their enormous contracts,
which become more lucrative every year. 8 PED use hurts not only the
individual leagues and players by creating a competitive imbalance, 9 but
also harms young athletes at the high school and college levels, creating
a larger, widespread societal problem.'O
PED use has been at the forefront of The Leagues for more than a
decade.' t However, players have been using PEDs since the mid1900s. t2 For years, PED use was The Leagues' best kept secret. 13 In
baseball, homeruns were traveling farther 4 and pitchers' fastballs were
reaching speeds never before seen. 15 Football players were getting
stronger and tackling more viciously than ever. 16 Basketball players were
running faster and jumping higher.' 7 Hockey players were playing
7. See id. Sportscaster Bob Costas discusses the competitive imbalance PED usage creates.
Id. Players that are not using PEDs are at a great disadvantage compared to the players using these
substances. Id. Costas also discusses the added pressure of lucrative contracts upon these players. Id.
8. See Sammy Said, The Top 10 Biggest Contract in Sports for 2013, RICHEST (Aug. 5,
2013), http://www.therichest.com/expensive-lifestyle/money/the-top- 10-biggest-contract-in-sportsfor-2013 (listing the ten biggest contracts in sports for 2013).
9. See BASEBALL: THE TENTH INNING, supra note 1 (featuring commentators discussing the
competitive imbalance created by the use of PEDs by some players while other players remain
clean).
10. See Calfee & Fadale, supra note 2, at e578-79 (explaining the widespread use of PEDs
amongst youth).
11. See Steve Keating, Steroid Era Continues to Hang over MLB, REUTERS (Aug. 5, 2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/20 13/08/05/us-baseball-doping-history-idUSBRE974X320 130805
("In 2003, BALCO, the little laboratory on the outskirts of San Francisco, became the epicenter of a
massive doping scandal that shocked the sporting world.").
12. See BASEBALL: THE TENTH INNING, supra note 1 (addressing the use of amphetamines in
MLB for decades, and the introduction of steroids in MLB in the 1980s); infra Part II.B.
13. See Keating, supra note 11. Prior to the "BALCO Scandal," fans were largely unaware of
the use of PEDs in The Leagues. Id.
14. See R. G. Tobin, On the Potentialof a Chemical Bonds: Possible Effects of Steroids on
Home Run Production in Baseball, 76 AM. J. PHYSICS. 15, 18 (2008) (illustrating how an increase in
muscle mass, resulting from PED use, allows players to perform better).
15. See id. at 18-19 (concluding that steroids increased pitchers' fastball speeds by
approximately four to five miles per hour).
16. See Glenn Dickey, NFL Overlooking the Impact of Steroids on Concussions, S.F.
EXAMINER (Dec. 17, 2010), http://www.sfexaminer.com/sanfrancisco/nfl-overlooking-the-impactof-steroids-on-concussions/Content?oid=2166437 (discussing how the increased strength and speed
of NFL players, a product of PED use, might be a cause of the increased concussion rate in the
NFL).
17. See Trevor Beal, The NBA's Greatest Vertical Leaps, INTERNET BILLBOARDS
(June 2, 2011), http://www.intemetbillboards.net/2011/06/02/the-nbas-greatest-vertical-leaps (listing
the highest vertical leaps in NBA history); Mike Bianchi, David Stern, NBA
SENTINEL
Drugs,
ORLANDO
About Performance-Enhancing
Better
Get
Serious
(May 24, 2011), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2011-05-24/sports/os-bianchi-nba-performance(arguing
that
enhancing-20110524_ 1_performance-enhancing-drugs-peds-nba-s-most-valuable
NBA players benefit from PEDs as they help them jump higher and run faster).
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tougher and hitting harder. 18 The record books were being rewritten with
unforeseen frequency.' 9 Incredibly, these amazing feats went
unquestioned because attendance at games was high and revenues were
even higher.2 ° It was not until the late 1980s that the National
Football League ("NFL") became the first league to consider banning
PEDs. 2 1 Nevertheless, the issue of PED use remained largely overlooked
for years to follow.22 Although The Leagues have implemented
more stringent policies,2 3 PED use remains rampant among all
professional sports.24
18.

See GEORGES LARAQUE, GEORGES LARAQUE: THE STORY OF THE NHL'S UNLIKELIEST

TOUGH GUY 132-33 (2011) (stating how PEDs help NHL players fight for longer periods of time
and in a more intense fashion).
19.

See BRIAN TUOHY, THE Fix IS IN: THE SHOWBIZ MANIPULATIONS OF THE NFL, MLB,

NBA, NHL AND NASCAR 186-92 (2010) (describing the time period in MLB after the 1994
players' strike when homerun records were being shattered); supra notes 14-18 and accompanying
text.
20. See TUOHY, supranote 19, at 186-92. After the 1994 players' strike in MLB, there was an
obvious need to get fans back to the stadiums and regenerate interest in the game; the best way to do
that was to have players hit homeruns. Id. MLB overlooked PED use in order to attract fans back to
the sport. Id.
21. See David R. McDuff & David Baron, Substance Use in Athletics: A Sports Psychiatry
Perspective, 24 CLINICS SPORTS MED. 885, 892 (2005). The use of PEDs in the NFL led to urine
testing in 1987 and eventually sanctions in 1989. Id.
22. See BASEBALL: THE TENTH INNING, supra note 1. Many say the height of the steroid era
was in the late 1990s and early 2000s, a decade after the NFL implemented its first policy. Id.
23. See Collective Bargaining Agreement Between National Hockey League and National
Hockey League Players' Association, NAT'L HOCKEY LEAGUE art. 47, 190 (2013) [hereinafter NHL
Collective Bargaining Agreement 2012], available at http://cdn.agilitycms.com/nhlpacom/PDF/
NHL_NHLPA_2013 CBA.pdf (testing players randomly for a maximum of three times during
training camp, the regular season, and playoffs, and an additional two times during the off-season);
Major League Baseball's Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment Program, MAJOR LEAGUE
BASEBALL 35 (2006) [hereinafter Joint Drug Agreement], available at http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/
pdf/jda.pdf (increasing the suspension for a first violation to 80 games, a second violation to 162
games, and a third violation to permanent suspension); National Football League Policy and
Program for Substances of Abuse, NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE 1 (2014) [hereinafter NFL Policy and
Program 2014], available at https://nflpaweb.blob.core.windows.net/media/Default/PDFs/
Active%20Players/Drug_SOA Policy_9-29-14.pdf ("The cornerstone of this Policy is the
Intervention Program. Under the Intervention Program, Players are tested, evaluated, treated, and
monitored for substance abuse. Players who do not comply with the requirements of the Intervention
Program ... are subject to the established levels of discipline set forth in this Policy."); NBA
Collective Bargaining Agreement, NAT'L BASKETBALL ASS'N art. XXXIII, 430-31 (December
2011) [hereinafter NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement], available at http://www.ipmall.info/
hosted resources/SportsEntLawInstitute/NBACBA(201 1)_(newversionreflectsJeremyLinRuling
)May30 2013.pdf (levying a 20-game suspension for a first violation, a 45-game suspension for a
second violation, and a permanent suspension for a third violation).
24. See, e.g., Will Brinson, Broncos Linebacker Von Miller Suspended Six Games by NFL,
CBS SPORTS (Aug. 20, 2013, 5:02 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/eye-on-football/
23239586/von-miller-suspended-6-games-by-nfl (noting the 6-game suspension of NFL player Von
Miller for violating the NFL's PED policy); Jason Brough, Toews on PEDs: 'The More Tests the
Better,' NBC SPORTS (Aug. 14, 2013, 2:14 PM), http://prohockeytalk.nbcsports.com/
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Governmental efforts to resolve the PED issue have consistently
fallen short of being effective. In the past, Congress attempted to pass
legislation 26 and proposed various solutions to urge and encourage The
Leagues to make their drug policies more stringent.27 However, neither
congressional efforts, nor The Leagues' stricter policies, have made an
impact on the players' use of PEDs.28 The inadequacies of the current
systems are apparent from the recent Biogenesis Scandal 29 in Major
League Baseball ("MLB"), as well as several other PED-related
controversies arising throughout The Leagues.30 These scandals and
controversies illustrate that PED use is still a widespread, ever-growing
issue in society, which must be resolved 31
through a collaborative effort
between the government and The Leagues.
This Note argues that the only way to completely rid The Leagues
of PED use, and thereby alleviate the detrimental effects of PEDs on
youth and society, is for the government and The Leagues to work
together to implement a zero-tolerance policy. 32 A zero-tolerance policy
implementing a lifetime ban for the first offense will replace the current
progressive discipline approach employed by The Leagues, 33 which
2013/08/14/toews-on-peds-the-more-tests-the-better (mentioning NHL player Jonathan Toews's
statement that "it would be naYve" to think that no player in the NHL is using PEDs); Alex Kennedy,
Hedo Turkoglu of Magic Suspended for Steroid Use, USA TODAY (Feb. 13, 2013,
9:04 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nba/2013/02/13/orlando-magic-hedo-turkoglunba-suspended/1917161 (reporting a 20-game suspension of NBA player Hedo Turkoglu for
violating the NBA's PED policy); Jim Peltz & Stephen Bailey, The 13 MLB Players Suspendedfor
Violating Banned-SubstancesRules, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2013, 5:20 PM), http://www.latimes.com/
sports/la-sp-0806-mlb-suspended-players-20130806,0,559942.story#axzz2iSkZvUZ8 (reporting that
thirteen MLB players were suspended for violating the league's drug policy in 2013).
25. See CHARLES A. SANTO & GERARD C.S. MILDNER, SPORT AND PUBLIC POLICY: SOCIAL,
POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 175-77 (2010) (noting the failed attempts by Congress to
pass legislation to reduce the use of PEDs in professional sports); infra Part III.C.
26. See SANTO & MILDNER, supra note 25, at 175-77; infra note 218 and accompanying text.
27. See SANTO & MILDNER, supra note 25, at 175-77; infra Part lGI.C, E.
28. See SANTO & MILDNER, supra note 25, at 175-77; Bryan E. Denham, Government and the
Pursuit of Rigorous Drug Testing in Major League Baseball: A Study in Political Negotiation and
Reciprocity, 2 INT'L J. SPORT MGMT. & MARKETING 379, 384-87 (2007) (criticizing Congress's
approach to PEDs in professional sports); supra note 24 and accompanying text.
29. See Barry Svrluga, Biogenesis Scandal Shows Baseball Has Not Put Its Drug Problems
Behind It, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/nationals/
biogenesis-scandal-shows-baseball-has-not-put-its-drug-problems-behind-it/2013/08/06/2341 bb58fee0- 1e2-9711-3708310f6f4dstory.html (reporting on the MLB Biogenesis Scandal).
30. See supra note 24.
31. See infra Part II.
32. See infra Part IV.A.
33. See, e.g., NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 23, at 430-31. The NBA, in
a similar fashion to the other three leagues, observes a progressive discipline approach where a
player is suspended for 20 games for the first offense, 45 games for the second offense, and
dismissed from the league and "disqualified from any association with" the league or any of its
teams for a third offense. Id.; see also Joint Drug Agreement, supra note 23, at 35 (implementing an
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suspends a player for a certain number of games for a first or second
violation, and suspends the player indefinitely for a third violation. 4 An
effective way to implement the zero-tolerance policy is to create a
hybrid-agency, comprised of The Leagues' representatives and
President-appointed government representatives. 35 This hybridagency will promote uniformity throughout The Leagues by creating
and enforcing a unified PED policy, conducting PED testing,
matters arising out of players' suspected and proven
and adjudicating
36
use.
PED
Part II of this Note defines PEDs and discusses their effects on
athletes.37 It then provides a brief history of PED use in The Leagues.38
Part II further examines the transformation of each league's drug testing
program over the years. 39 Finally, it summarizes the insufficient PEDprevention methods currently enforced by The Leagues.40 Part III
highlights the increasing need for government intervention due to the
growing use of PEDs by high school and college athletes.4' Part III also
explains the negative effects of PEDs on The Leagues, the players, and
society as a whole.4 2 Moreover, Part III details Congress's failed
attempts to regulate PED use in The Leagues, including the Bay Area
Laboratory Co-operative ("BALCO") Scandal,4 3 The Mitchell Report,"
and the proposed Acts that failed to pass the House and the Senate.45 In
addition, Part III recounts the recent Biogenesis Scandal and the lack of
owner accountability in The Leagues.46 Finally, it describes the United
80-game suspension for a first offense, 162-game suspension for a second offense, and a permanent
suspension with the opportunity to apply for reinstatement for a third offense); NFL Policy and
Program 2014, supra note 23, at 11-19 (describing the stages of violations and the discipline that
accompanies each stage); NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement 2012, supra note 23, at 191-92
(implementing a 20-game suspension for a first offense, a 60-game suspension for a second offense,
and a "permanent suspension" with the opportunity for reinstatement for a third offense).
34. See infra Part II.C; supra note 33.
35. See infra Part IV.B.
36. See infra Part IV.B.
37. See infra Part II.A.
38. See infra Part lI.B.
39. See infra Part II.C.
40. See infra Part II.C.
41. Calfee & Fadale, supra note 2, at e578-79, e581; see infra Part III.A.1.
42. See infra Part hI.A.
43. See Keating, supra note 11; infra Part II. B.
44. See GEORGE J. MITCHELL, REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONER OF BASEBALL OF AN
INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION INTO THE ILLEGAL USE OF STEROIDS AND OTHER PERFORMANCE
ENHANCING SUBSTANCES BY PLAYERS IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL SR-1 (Dec. 13, 2007)
(reporting, through extensive interviewing and investigation, how and why the PED problem
emerged in MLB); infra Part III.C.

45. See Denham, supra note 28, at 384-87; infra Part III.C.
46. See infra Part III.D.
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and why its particular

program-which has worked well for the Olympics and other
international sports-will not work for The Leagues.4 8 Part IV argues
that The Leagues should implement a unified zero-tolerance policy with
government assistance.49 Part IV proposes that the government should
contract with The Leagues to establish a quasi-governmental hybridagency to determine rules and regulations for the testing and monitoring
of PEDs in The Leagues, conduct the testing for PEDs,50 and adjudicate
matters arising out of possible PED use in The Leagues.5 1 Part IV further
addresses the possible constitutional challenges that will be faced by the
proposed hybrid-agency. 52 Part V then reasons why this solution will
succeed where others have failed.53 Part V concludes this Note
and reiterates why a zero-tolerance policy in The Leagues, and
government intervention through a hybrid-agency, is critical in resolving
the PED use issue.54
II.

PERFORMANCE ENHANCING DRUG USE IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS

PED use in sports is not a recent phenomenon.55 Athletes have used
PEDs to gain a competitive edge for over a century.56 Subpart A details
the increased sophistication of PEDs and outlines their dangerous effects
on athletes' health.57 Subpart B summarizes the history of PED use in
sports.58 Subpart C considers how the drug programs in The Leagues

47. See USADA 's Anti-Doping Programs,U.S. ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, http://www.usada.org/
about/programs (last visited Feb. 15, 2015).
48. See Laura S. Stewart, Comment, Has the United States Anti-Doping Agency Gone Too
Far?Analyzing the Shift from 'Beyond a Reasonable Doubt'to 'ComfortableSatisfaction,' 13 VILL.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 207, 228-36 (2006) (arguing that the standard of review being implemented in
the USADA proceedings is unfair for the athletes); infra Part III.E.
49. See Jeff Seidel, Jhonny PeraltaProbably Returning, But MLB Needs Lifetime Ban to Get
Rid of PEDs, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Sept. 20, 2013, 3:44 AM), http://hosted2.ap.org/PASCR/
72917a5e85e24b6f8e667afcel dda249/Article_2013-09-20/id-07fb4ec I 99c0423c49ef006b382a1924
(arguing that MLB needs a lifetime ban to eliminate PEDs); infra Part [V.A.
50. See, e.g., KEVIN R. KOSAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30533, THE QUASI
GOVERNMENT: HYBRID ORGANIZATIONS WITH BOTH GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR LEGAL
CHARACTERISTICS 2 (2011) (defining quasi-governmental entities as entities with "some legal
relation or association" with the government); infra Part 1V.B.
51. See infra Part V.B.
52. See infra Part V.C.
53. See infra Part lV.D.
54. See infra Part V.
55. See DANIEL M. ROSEN, DOPE: A HISTORY OF PERFORMANCE ENHANCEMENT IN SPORTS
FROM THE NINETEENTH CENTURY TO TODAY 1 (2008).
56. See id.
57. See infra Part II.A.
58. See infra Part IIB.
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have evolved to combat PED use, and how the violators have remained a
step ahead of the enforcers.5 9
A. PerformanceEnhancingDrugs and Their Effects
There are six main categories of banned PEDs: (1) anabolicandrogenic steroids; 60 (2) hormones and hormone releasing substances; 6 1
(3) masking agents; 62 (4) stimulants; 63 (5) blood doping;6 and (6) gene
doping.6 5 When used by athletes, PEDs provide several unfair physical
59. See infra Part B.C.
60. DrugFacts:Anabolic Steroids, NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, http://www.drugabuse.gov/
publications/drugfacts/anabolic-steroids (last visited Feb. 15, 2015) ("'Anabolic steroids' is the
familiar name for synthetic variants of the male sex hormone testosterone. The proper term for these
compounds is anabolic-androgenicsteroids (abbreviated AAS)-'anabolic' referring to musclebuilding and 'androgenic' referring to increased male sexual characteristics."); The World AntiDoping Code: The 2014 ProhibitedList InternationalStandard,WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY 2-3
(May 17, 2014), https://wada-main-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/resources/files/WADA-Revised-2014Prohibited-List-EN.PDF [hereinafter WADA Doping Code 2014]. Anabolic steroids are the most
commonly used PEDs in The Leagues. PerformanceEnhancingDrugs, supra note 3.
61. See Shayna M. Sigman, Are We All Dopes? A Behavior Law & Economics Approach to
Legal Regulation of Doping in Sports, 19 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 125, 157-57 (2008). The author
describes some of the common hormone and hormone releasing substances. Id Erythropoietin
("EPO"), regulates the production of red blood cells. Id. at 151. Human Growth Hormone ("HGH")
stimulates growth and cell reproduction. Id. at 152. Insulin is used by the body to convert glucose in
the blood to glycogen, and when used in conjunction with growth hormones, it can increase muscle
mass. Id. at 155. Moreover, "[b]eta blockers, also known as beta-adrenergic antagonists, block the
body's receptors for epinephrine (adrenaline) and norepinephrine (noradrenaline), hormones that are
part of the sympathetic nervous system." Id. at 156. When consumed, these substances can increase
muscle mass and help players heal quicker. Id. at 153-54; see also WADA Doping Code 2014,
supranote 60, at 4-5 (listing various banned common hormone and hormone releasing substances).
62. See Sigman, supra note 61, at 157 ("Masking agents are drugs that are capable of hiding
the presence of other impermissible substances."); WADA Doping Code 2014, supra note
60, at 5-6.
63.

See NICOLETrtE P. CONTI & PAULA JOHANSON, DRUGS & CONSEQUENCES: THE TRUTH

ABOUT AMPHETAMINES AND STIMULANTS 4 (2012) ("Stimulants (also called uppers) are drugs that
speed up the mind and body. Amphetamines are one kind of stimulant. They increase activity in the
nervous system and cause a number of physical and psychological changes."); Sigman, supra note
61, at 158 ("[Stimulants] increase alertness, counter fatigue, increase competitiveness, and suppress
appetite. This class includes substances such as amphetamines, ephedrine, and cocaine, which are all
highly addictive."); WADA Doping Code 2014, supra note 60, at 8-9.
64. See JENNIFER L. MINIGH, SPORTS MEDICINE 116 (2007) ("Blood doping.., involves
either a blood transfusion of red blood cells or administration of drug erythropoietin, which
pharmacologically increases red blood cell mass. Blood doping improves an athlete's ability to
perform endurance exercise and reduces physiological strain."); Sigman, supra note 61, at 160
("Blood doping refers to the practice of using transfused blood or red blood cells to increase the
number of red blood cells available to carry oxygen from the lungs to the muscles.").
65. See MINIGH, supra note 64, at 62 ("Gene therapy is the insertion of genetic material into
an individual's cells or tissues to treat disease."); Sigman, supranote 61, at 162 ("Gene therapy is a
nascent medical field that refers to the insertion of a new gene-a functional one-into human cells
to correct the DNA for some defective, malfunctioning, or absent gene."). Gene doping, the newest
form of PEDs, gives players similar advantages as the other PEDs. Sigman, supra note 61, at 163.
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and physiological advantages, by exponentially increasing mass,
strength, speed, mental competitiveness, pain threshold, alertness, and
self-confidence.66 Moreover, players are using more sophisticated PEDs
and techniques to recover from injuries up to six times faster.67 Many
players have even admitted to using human growth hormone ("HGH")a type of PED that stimulates muscle repair and cell reproduction 68-in
order to return to playing their sport quicker after an injury.69
Despite the short-term positive effects of PEDs,7 ° they are
extremely damaging to a player's health in the long-term.71 PED use can
cause lung cancer, heart failure, diabetes, tumors, and many other
negative side effects.72 The use of PEDs not only harms the players using
them, but it can also indirectly harm the other players on the field.73 In
the NFL, player concussions have become a glaring problem, 74 and the
use of PEDs might be a major factor for the increased number of
incidences.75 In the National Hockey League ("NHL"), players are
permitted to engage in physical fights during the game,76 and since PEDs
enable players to become physically numb and can cause rage, there is a
66. See Sigman, supra note 61, at 146-47.
67. See Simon Doessing et al., Growth Hormone Stimulates the Collagen Synthesis in Human
Tendon and Skeletal Muscle Without Affecting Myofibrillar Protein Synthesis, 588 J. PHYSIOLOGY
341, 348-49 (2010) (explaining how HGH decreases recovery time); Sigman, supra note 61, at 147;
see also Michael S. Schmidt, Pettitte Confirms Mitchell Report and Says He Used H.G.H., N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2007, at G1 (discussing New York Yankees' pitcher Andy Pettitte's use of HGH in
2002 to recover quicker from elbow surgery).
68. See Sigman, supra note 61, at 153-54; see also Schmidt, supra note 67 (reporting that
Andy Pettitte admitted to using PEDs).
69. See Schmidt, supra note 67.
70. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
71. See MINIGH, supranote 64, at 114; Sigman, supra note 61, at 148-49.
72. See MINIGH, supranote 64, at 114. Some of the common side effects of PED use include:
Long-term risks include liver damage (including cancer, failure, or both), jaundice, renal
failure, hypertension, elevated LDL (bad cholesterol) and decreased HDL (good
cholesterol), damage to the heart's left ventricle and acne. Steroid use can also bring
about mood swings, including manic phases and euphoria, periods of extreme aggression
or violence (often referred to as 'roid rage [sic]), paranoia, anxiety, and depression. In
addition, there are sport-specific injury risks that also stem from continual AAS use, such
as cramps and tom muscles and the like.
Sigman, supranote 61, at 148-49.
73. See Dickey, supra note 16.
74. See Jason M. Breslow, For the NFL, Focus on Concussions Yields Mixed Results, PBS
(Sept. 24, 2013, 12:20 PM), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/sports/concussionwatch/about-concussion-watch-2. During the 2012 NFL regular season, a total of 160 players
reported either head injuries or concussions. Id.
75. See id. (explaining the increased head injuries in the NFL and the horrific effects of such
injuries down the road such as brain damage, dementia, memory loss, and depression); see also
Dickey, supra note 16 (drawing the connection between steroid use, which results in bigger,
stronger, and faster players, to the increased concussion rate in the NFL).
76. See LARAQUE, supra note 18, at 131.
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higher risk of serious injury.77 Additionally, players using PEDs are
bigger and stronger, which results in excessive injuries when they are
involved in such altercations.78
The harmful effects of PEDs are no longer limited to The
Leagues. 79 A more serious problem is the use of PEDs by amateur
athletes.8 0 This often results in drug overdose and, in an increasing
amount of cases, death. 81 The damaging effects of PEDs are severe and
can often be life-threatening. 82 Therefore, it is imperative to employ a
permanent solution to protect athletes at all levels.83
B. The History of PerformanceEnhancingDrugs in Sports
PED use in sports can be traced back to the 1860s in sports such as
cycling and swimming. 84 By the 1930s, amphetamines-a type of PED
that provides athletes with increased energy 8 5-became popular in sports
and among soldiers during World War II;86 and, by the 1950s, the use of
a new type of PED, anabolic steroids,87 became popular in professional
weightlifting. 88 Unfortunately, at the time, people were generally
unaware of the negative effects of PEDs, and viewed PEDs as a
scientific breakthrough. 89
Then, in the 1960s, anabolic steroids were introduced to The
Leagues, when the San Diego Chargers of the American Football
77. See id. at 132-33; Sigman, supranote 61, at 148-49.
78. See LARAQUE,supra note 18, at 131-33.
79. See Calfee & Fadale, supra note 2, at e578-79.
80. See Amy Brittain, Strong at Any Cost: Five Deaths in 19 Months Linked to Steroids,
Lowen's Pharmacy, NJ.COM (Dec. 12, 2010, 7:30 AM), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2010/
12/strongat anycost five deaths.html (reporting the deaths of five people caused by steroid
overdose); Ariana Hunt, Steroid Use Can Lead to Physical and Psychological Problems,
INDIANAPOLIS RECORDER (Apr. 10, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.indianapolisrecorder.com/
health/article_24ccfcOO-1832-576c-ab85-8428d273322c.html (explaining that the effects of
unsupervised steroid use can be irreversible).
81. See Brittain, supra note 80.
82. Id.
83. See supranotes 79-82 and accompanying text.
84. See ROSEN, supra note 55, at 2. In the 1860s, Dutch canal swimmers in Amsterdam used
stimulants in competition. Id.

85. See supranote 63.
86. See ROSEN, supra note 55, at 2-3.
87. See supranote 60.
88. See ROSEN, supra note 55, at 3, 26.
89. See id. at 1. PEDs were not always looked upon as harmful and dangerous substances:
In the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century... [i]f a new drug or a potion
could help an athlete run or cycle or swim faster than his opponents, many people saw no
problem with the athlete using it. Science and medicine were viewed as ways to improve
life, and for athletes, that meant doing better in competition.
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League 9 (which has since merged with the NFL) hired Alvin Roy as its
training coach. 91 Roy had previously worked with the American
weightlifting team, where he provided the athletes with "dianabol,' '92 a

type of anabolic steroid that increases muscle mass and strength.93 The
use of anabolic steroids quickly made its way into MLB in the late
1960s94 when baseball players began training with weightlifters. 95 Tom

House, a former MLB player, "was secretly working out at a gymagainst his manager's orders"-when he asked local weightlifters what
they used to get so big; they told him that they used dianabol.96 House

subsequently admitted that he began using dianabol in 1969. 97 However,
the use of amphetamines in MLB can be traced back even further to the
late 1940s.98 While amphetamines help players concentrate and stay

energized, amphetamines do not have the same physical effects as
anabolic steroids. 99 Nonetheless,

The Leagues have banned both

90. See The AFL, PRO FOOTBALL HALL OF FAME, http://www.profootballhof.com/
history/decades/1960s/afl.aspxprint=yes (last visited Feb. 15, 2015). In 1959, the American
Football League ("AFL") was organized by Dallas businessman Lamar Hunt. Id.The AFL began
play in 1960. Id.The first cities to support a team in the AFL were Dallas, Denver, Houston, Los
Angeles, Minneapolis, and New York. Id. Eventually, in 1970, the NFL and the AFL merged to
form what is now known as the NFL. Id.
91. See ROSEN, supra note 55, at 27-28.
92. See id; Dianabol (Methandrostenolone), ASS'N AGAINST STEROID ABUSE,
http://www.steroidabuse.com/Profiles/Dianabol.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2015) ("Dianabol or Dbol
as it is also known is the common trade name for the anabolic steroidal hormone
Methandrostenolone. Methandrostenolone carries with it highly anabolic traits as well as moderate
androgenic traits which allow it to be well-suited for both strength and size.").
93. See ROSEN, supra note 55, at 27-28. Alvin Roy used his knowledge of steroids, which he
obtained when he was affiliated with the U.S. weight lifting team, to help the football players train
harder and become stronger. Id.;
Dianabol(Methandrostenolone), supranote 92.
94. See id. at 37.
95. See id. at 37-38; McDuff& Baron, supra note 21, at 891-92.
96. See ROSEN, supra note 55, at 38; Ron Kroichick, House a 'Failed Experiment' with
Steroids, S.F. GATE (May 3, 2005, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/sports/kroichick/
article/House-a-failed-experiment-with-steroids-2637503.php. In an interview, Tom House admitted
that he used steroids along with many of his teammates. Id.
97. See ROSEN, supra note 55, at 38. House also admitted that in his estimation, around six to
seven players on every team were using steroids. Id."'I pretty much popped everything cold
turkey,' House said in a phone interview. 'We were doing steroids they wouldn't give to horses.
That was the '60s, when nobody knew."' Kroichick, supra note 96.
98. See ROSEN, supra note 55, at 2-3 (revealing that "[a]mphetamines came into wide use
during the Second World War"); see also JIM BROSNAN, THE LONG SEASON 47-48 (2002)

(recounting MLB pitcher, Jim Brosnan, admitting that he used amphetamines to get through the
long baseball season).
99. See McDuff & Baron, supra note 21, at 888 ("Despite the lack of strong scientific
evidence of a positive effect on athletic performance, amphetamines quickly became the most
popular ergogenic aids, because of their demonstrated and perceived positive effects on selfconfidence, mood, attention, aggression, and energy."); see also Matt David, Should
MLB Fans Be as Outraged About Amphetamines as Steroids?, BLEACHER REP. (Mar. 28, 2010),
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/369878-mlb-should-we-be-as-outraged-about-amphetamines-as-
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substances, along with other PEDs, as they provide players with an
unfair competitive advantage. 1 0
C. Each League's Efforts and InadequaciesConcerningPerformance
EnhancingDrugs
The Leagues face common problems with their current drug
programs: (1) the testing is inadequate, and many players escape
undetected;' 0 ' (2) the progressive discipline approach implemented by
The Leagues provides little incentive for players to abide by the drug
program;10 2 (3) the confidentiality of these proceedings, which is crucial
in such sensitive cases and is vital for the maintenance of players'
reputations, is many times sacrificed; 0 3 and (4) these programs rely
heavily upon the Commissioners' discretion,104 which can result in
arbitrary decisions that the players must appeal in arbitration, and often
times seek judicial intervention, in order to assert their rights. 0 5 In each
league, appeals are adjudicated through an arbitration process, where an
impartial third-party arbitrator, agreed upon by the Commissioner and

steroids (discussing the difference between amphetamines and steroids).
100. See Joint Drug Agreement, supra note 23, at 9-13 (listing all the prohibited substances in
MLB).
101. See Svrluga, supra note 29. None of the thirteen players that were suspended tested
positive for PEDs. Id. This shows that although they were using banned substances, their drug tests
were negative. Id.
102. See Paul White, Johnny Peralta's Contract with CardinalsDraws Scrutiny, USA TODAY
(Nov. 25, 2013, 6:05 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/mlb/2013/l1/25/jhonny-peraltareaction-to-cardinals-contractl3708135 (highlighting the outrage of some players upon MLB player
Johnny Peralta's new $53 million contract, after recently being suspended for PED use).
103. See Dayn Perry, AMLBPA: Biogenesis Leaks Interfere with Investigation, CBS SPORTS (Jul.
11, 2013, 11:17 AM), http://www.cbssports.com/mlb/eye-on-baseball/22721023/mlbpa-releasesstatement-on-biogenesis-leaks (describing how the leaks of confidential information about players to
the media is a concern for Michael Weiner, the former Major League Baseball Players' Association
("MLBPA") President, and that such leaks can result in difficulties during the investigation); Steve
Phillips, If Names Are Released, Reputations Might Be Ruined, ESPN (Apr. 29, 2007, 5:39 PM),
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=2853067 (explaining that once a player is linked to
PEDs, his reputation is ruined forever).
104. See, e.g., MAJOR LEAGUE CONSTITUTION art. II, §§ 1-2 (1921), available at
http://www.bizofbaseball.com/docs/MLConsititutionJune2005Update.pdf. The Commissioner is the
Chief Executive Officer of the league. Id.
105. See, e.g., Mike Axisa, A-Rod Suing MLB and Bud Selig, Yankees Team Doctor, CBS
SPORTS (Oct. 4, 2013, 10:37 AM), http://www.cbssports.com/mlb/eye-on-baseballI2400108 1/reportalex-rodriguez-is-suing-mlb-claiming-a-witch-hunt (reporting the lawsuit Alex Rodriguez had filed
against MLB, Bud Selig, and the New York Yankees team doctor regarding his 211-game
suspension); Doug Farrar, Two Broncos Players Sue the NFL Over PED Suspensions, YAHOO!
SPORTS (Mar. 13, 2012), http://sports.yahoo.com/nfl/blog/shutdown comer/post/nflpa-releasesstatement-on-broncos-ped-suspensions?um-nfl,wp20435 (reporting on a lawsuit that two Denver
Broncos players filed against the NFL for violating the drug policy).
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the Players' Association, 10 6 rules on the matter. 10 7 Although the
arbitrators are impartial, they must follow the rules and regulations
established by that particular league.10 8 Furthermore, arbitrators may be
terminated without cause. 10 9 Essentially, the Commissioner or the
Players' Association may terminate an arbitrator if they are unsatisfied
with the arbitrator's decision. 10 If a player is displeased with the result
of the arbitration, the player may appeal to a federal court."' However,
an arbitration award is almost impossible to vacate or set aside, 1 2 and
even when vacated, the dispute is merely remanded back to the
arbitration process with the same initial inherent limitations." 3
1. Major League Baseball
The first efforts to ban PEDs in MLB date back to 1971, when
Bowie Kuhn, then Commissioner of MLB, requested that players follow
the federal laws regarding drug use. 1 4 Despite such a request, PED use
106. See, e.g., History of the Major League Baseball PlayersAssociation, MLBPLAYERS.COM,
http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/info/history.jsp (last visited Feb. 15, 2015). A Players' Association is a labor
union of players that represents players during collective bargaining negotiations, and any other
matters arising out of the collective bargaining agreement. Id.; see also NFL Policy and Program
2014, supra note 23, at 24 (providing the arbitration panel selection process).
107. See, e.g., Grievance and Arbitration Procedure and Special Procedures with
Respect to Disputes Involving Player Discipline, NAT'L BASKETBALL ASS'N COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. XXXI, 326-27, available at http://www.nbpa.org/sites/default/files/

ARTICLE%20XXXI.pdf; Joint Drug Agreement, supra note 23, at 45; NFL Policy and Program
2014, supra note 23, at 24; NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement 2012, supra note 23, at 110; see
also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 119 (9th ed. 2009) ("Arbitration: A method of dispute resolution
involving one or more neutral third parties who are usually agreed to by the disputing parties and
whose decision is binding.").
108. See, e.g., Joint Drug Agreement, supra note 23, at 46.
109. See Bob Nightengale, MLB Fires Longtime ArbitratorShyam Das, USA TODAY (May 14,
2012, 8:50 PM), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/dailypitch/post/2012/05/shyam-das-mlbarbitrator-fired-ryan-braun/l#.Umq-OvkU-So (reporting that MLB fired arbitrator Shyam Das for
his decision to disregard Ryan Braun's positive drug test because of a technicality).
110. See 2012-2016 Basic Agreement, MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 42 [hereinafter Basic
Agreement], available at http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba-english.pdf, see also Nightengale,
supra note 109 (examining MLB's firing of long time arbitrator Shyam Das).
111. See, e.g., Chris Greenberg, A-Rod Statement Denies PED Use, Promises
to Fight MLB Ban in Federal Court, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 25, 2014, 4:01 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/1 1/arod-statement-suspension-ped-court n 4582249.html
(discussing how Alex Rodriguez is planning to appeal the arbitration decision banning him for 162
games in federal court).
112. See Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 511 (2001) ("Even
when the arbitrator's award may properly be vacated, the appropriate remedy is to remand the case
for further arbitration proceedings.").
113. See id. (holding that even when an arbitration award is vacated, it must be remanded back
to the arbitration tribunal with directions).
114. See Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 844 (1970) (requiring a prescription for the
use of anabolic steroids). The policy did not explicitly list any banned substances, however, it
required players to follow the federal laws at the time. David Epstein, The Rules, the Law, the

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol43/iss2/8

12

Chaudry: Caught in a Rundown: The Need for a Zero-Tolerance Drug Policy to

20141

CA UGHT IN A RUNDOWN

in MLB was not explicitly banned until 1991, when then-Commissioner
Fay Vincent sent a memorandum to every team explicitly banning all
illegal drugs from MLB.115 In 1997, Vincent's successor, Bud Selig,
reiterated this memo by asserting "that any players violating the policy
'risk permanent expulsion from the game.""'1 6 However, official drug
testing did not begin in MLB until 2003, when the testing was added to
the Major League Baseball 2002 Basic Agreement."' This was a
substantial step because previously, the Major League Baseball Players'
Association ("MLBPA") was extremely reluctant to accept any form of
random drug testing. 118 This breakthrough was attributed to heightened
public awareness of PED use in sports, and increased public pressure to
eliminate PED use from MLB. "9
The new Major League Baseball Joint Drug Agreement ("Joint
Drug Agreement"), 120 negotiated between Commissioner Selig and
former MLBPA President, Michael Wiener, might be the most
comprehensive drug program among The Leagues; yet, PED use remains
common in MLB. 121 Under the updated Joint Drug Agreement, a player
is suspended 80 games for a first violation, 162 games for a second
violation, and permanently for a third violation.1 22 However, if
permanently suspended, the player may apply
for reinstatement, which is
13
subject to the Commissioner's discretion.
The Joint Drug Agreement contains an extensive list of prohibited
substances, requires blood testing to detect PEDs such as HGH, which is

Reality: A Primer on Baseball's Steroid Policy Through the Years, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Feb. 16,

2009), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1 151761/index.htm.
115. See Epstein, supra note 114. The memorandum prohibited the use and possession of any
illegal drugs or controlled substances, including steroids, if the players did not have a prescription.
Id.
116.
117.

See id.
See id.; see also 2003-2006 Basic Agreement, MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 161-64,

available at http://bizofbaseball.com/docs/2002_2006basicagreement.pdf
testing to the MLB drug program).
118.

(adding official PED

See Paul D. Staudohar, Baseball Negotiations: A New Agreement, MONTHLY LAB. REV.,

Dec. 2002, at 15, 20. The MLBPA agreed to steroid testing on a trial basis for 2003, however, it did
not agree to testing for other substances such as illegal drugs or other PEDs. Id.
119. See id.; see also SANTO & MILDNER, supra note 25, at 173-74 (discussing the increased
urgency to rid professional sports of PEDs after the BALCO Scandal).
120. See generally Joint Drug Agreement, supra note 23.
121. See Svrluga, supra note 29.
122. See
Nathaniel
Vinton,
MLB
Adds
Better
Drug
Tests,
Longer
Bans
and
Postseason
Ineligibility for
Offenders,
N.Y.
DAILY
NEWS
(Mar.
28,
2014, 7:19 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/i-team/mlb-adds-better-drug-tests-longer-

bans-postseason-ineligibility-article-l.1738443
violations).
123.

(explaining MLB's updated punishments for PED

See Joint Drug Agreement, supra note 23, at 35.
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undetectable through urine testing, 11 4 and enforces a strict liability policy
by holding players accountable for banned substances within their bodies
regardless of intent. 125 Players are responsible for knowing the banned
PEDs and making sure they are not exposed to them. 126 Unfortunately,
even with these measures, the Joint Drug Agreement has proven to be
inadequate, not only with respect to drug testing, but also in issuing
proper punishments. 127 This is evident in the recent Biogenesis Scandal,
where zero out of the thirteen players suspended actually tested positive
for PEDs, 128 and in Commissioner Selig's arbitrary decision to suspend
New York Yankees' third baseman Alex Rodriguez for an
unprecedented 211 games, which was later reduced to 162 games after
an arbitration hearing. 129 Although the Joint Drug Agreement is
considered the toughest in The Leagues, it has its deficiencies. 30
2. National Football League
The NFL began testing for PEDs in 1987-long before MLB' 3 1_
and issued its first suspensions in 1989.132 However, in this everevolving world of PEDs, the NFL's drug policy remained virtually
unchanged for almost twenty years. 133 In 2007, the NFL and the National
Football League Players' Association ("NFLPA") agreed on the new,
tougher, National Football League's 2010 Policy and Program for
Substances of Abuse ("NFL Drug Policy"). 134 Most notably, the NFL

124. See Joe Halverson, MLB Blood Testing Will Detect More than Just HGH, INT'L Bus.
TIMES (Jan. 14, 2013, 4:20 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/sportsnet/mlb-blood-testing-will-detectmore-just-hgh-1014402 (noting that MLB has become the first league to conduct HGH testing).
125. See Joint Drug Agreement, supra note 23, at 46. The strict liability clause states: "The
Commissioner's Office is not required to otherwise establish intent, fault, negligence, or knowing
use of a Prohibited Substance on the Player's part." Id.
126. See id.
127. See Svrluga, supra note 29.
128. Seeid.
129. See Greenberg, supra note 111.
130. See Jennifer Laaser & John Fauber, Baseball's Drug Testing: Thorough or Easily
Thwarted?, J. SENTINEL (July 14, 2013), http://www.jsonline.com/news/health/up-to-20-majorleague-players-to-be-suspended-but-not-because-of-stringent-tests-b9939132z1 -215413631 .html
(arguing that although MLB's drug program is considered the toughest in professional sports, it is
still inadequate).
131. See Nancy Gay, Steroids Spotlight Turns to Football, S.F. GATE (Oct. 27, 2006, 4:00
AM), http://www.sfgate.com/sports/article/Steroids-spotlight-turns-to-football-2548741 .php.
132. See id.
133. See Timeline: A Century of Drugs and the Athlete, USA TODAY
(Mar. 1, 2007, 12:29 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/2007-02-28-timeline-drugsathletex.htm?loc=interstitialskip [hereinafter Timeline].
134.

See Associated Press, NFL to Test for More Performance-EnhancingDrugs, ESPN (Jan.

24, 2007), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2741136
policy).
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Drug Policy added Erythropoietin testing, increased the number of
players randomly tested, and levied stricter fines. 135 In 2014, the NFL
and the NFLPA agreed to new updates to the NFL Drug Policy. 136 The
most significant improvements the NFL made to its new drug policy
were the additions of HGH testing and the enlistment of an independent
arbitrator to hear appeals. 137 The NFL follows a progressive disciplinary
38
system and observes a strict liability standard similar to MLB.
Although the NFL issues frequent suspensions in accordance with its
drug policy139-similarly to MLB-the NFL's testing and adjudication
procedures are inadequate for many of the same reasons. 40 This is
evident by a lawsuit filed and settled by two Denver Broncos players
41
against the NFL, for being suspended despite never failing a drug test.'
The NFL alleged that the urine samples provided by the players were
non-human, which is a separate violation of the NFL Drug Policy, but
nonetheless deemed a "failure."'' 42 The mere possibility that the players
were able to submit non-human samples, or that the NFL has mistakenly
determined human samples to be non-human, is yet another example of
the testing inadequacies of the NFL's drug program.143
3. National Basketball Association
Although MLB and the NFL have recognized PED use as a major
issue within their respective leagues, the National Basketball Association
("NBA") and the NHL continue to turn a blind eye to the issue.' 4 4 The
135. See id. EPO is a hormone that regulates the production of red blood cells. Sigman, supra
note 61, at 151.
136. See Jeff Gray, NFL Releases Details of New Drug Policy, SB NATION (Sept.
19, 2014, 5:05 PM), http://www.sbnation.com/nfl/2014/9/19/6559533/nfl-new-drug-policy-detailsnflpa (explaining the updates the NFL made to its drug policy).
137. See id. NFL has also added an extra 2-game suspension for players that use masking
agents to cover up their PED use. Id.
138. See NFL Policy and Program 2014, supra note 23, at 17, 27.
139. See, e.g., Brinson, supra note 24; Farrar, supra note 105.
140. See supra notes 101-13 and accompanying text.
141. See Farrar, supra note 105.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See IBTimes Staff Reporter, Bulls' Derrick Rose: NBA Has a Steroids Problem, INT'L
BUS. TIMES (May 22, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/bullsE2%80%99-derrick-rosenba-has-steroids-problem-644189. Former NBA Commissioner David Stem, when asked about
steroid use in the NBA, stated: "It's not a problem at the present time that we think we have." Id.
However, when Derrick Rose, a point guard for the Chicago Bulls, was asked about steroid use in
the NBA, he said: "It's huge, and I think we need a level playing field, where nobody has that
advantage over the next person." Id.From this comparison, one can infer that Rose, who is in the
locker rooms and who likely knows more about player activity behind the scenes, is concerned that
PED use is affecting the NBA, while Stem is content with the NBA's revenue stream. Id.; see also
Kathy Kiely, Focus on NBA, NHL to Improve Drug-Testing Policies, USA TODAY (Nov. 15, 2005,
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NBA failed to add steroids to its banned substance policy until 1999.145
The testing was also quite inconsistent amongst all players, as it only
147
146
and rookies four times a year.
tested veterans once a year,
Moreover, the new Anti-Drug Program, which came into effect in 2012,
48
is only a slight improvement.1
Under the new NBA Anti-Drug Program, a first offense results in a
20-game suspension, a second offense results in a 45-game suspension,
and a third offense results in a permanent suspension with an option for
reinstatement after two years.149 However, a player may only be
reinstated after he has acquired the Commissioner's and the Players
Association's approval. 50 In addition, the players can only be tested a
maximum of four times during a season, which is better than the
previous agreement--only testing veteran players once during the entire
year-but is still far too infrequent.' 5' Furthermore, the NBA Anti-Drug
Program does not include blood testing or HGH testing. 52 Because of
the infrequent testing and lack of HGH testing, NBA's Anti-Drug
Program lacks the sophistication of MLB's and the NFL's programs,
which, as previously mentioned, have proven inadequate to rid The
153
Leagues of PEDs and give players proper due process.

11:38 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/basketball/nba/2005-11-15-nhl-nba-drug-testingsidebar x.htm (arguing that both the NBA and the NHL lack strong PED policies).
145. See Timeline, supra note 133. This timeline shows that the NBA and the NHL did not add
PEDs to their drug policies until the late 1990s and early 2000s, respectively. Id.
146. See Paul A. Fortenberry & Brian E. Hoffhnan, Illegal Muscle -A ComparativeAnalysis of
ProposedSteroid Legislationand the Policies in ProfessionalSports' CBAs That Led to the Steroid
Controversy, 5 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 121, 132 (2006) (mentioning that veterans-players with
more than one year of service time in the NBA-were only allowed to be tested once a year under
the old policy).
147. See id. (comparing the old NBA drug policy to the new one).
148. See id. at 133; see also Nothin'But Net: NBA Drug Policy Barely Adequate, Fox NEWS
(Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/sports/2013/08/28/nothin-but-net-nba-drug-policybarely-adequate (arguing that the NBA's drug policy is barely adequate since there is no blood
testing, and other than the four random times the players are drug tested, all other testing requires
reasonable cause).
149. See NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 23, at 430-31, 435.
150. Id. at436.
151. See id. at 419; Nothin' But Net.: NBA Drug Policy Barely Adequate, supra note 148
(emphasizing the inadequacy of the NBA drug program). In addition to the random testing, the NBA
may test a player if the NBA or the Players' Association has reasonable cause to believe that a
player is engaged in the use of a banned substance. NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra
note 23, at 416-17; see also Fortenberry & Hoffman, supra note 146, at 132 (comparing the NBA's
old testing policies to the newer ones).
152. See Nothin 'But Net: NBA Drug Policy Barely Adequate, supranote 148.
153. See id.; supraPart I.A.1-2. ,
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4. National Hockey League

The NHL expresses a similar lack of urgency, with players
expressing their concern over inadequate PED testing standards. 154 The
NHL did not begin testing for PEDs until 2005.155 While the NHL
previously had a banned substance list, it did not mandate testing, and
thus, the system was wholly ineffective. 56 Similar to the NBA, the
NHL's current
testing is too infrequent, as players are only tested three
57

times a year.
Under the current NHL policy, a first offense results in a 20-game
suspension, a second offense results in a 60-game suspension, and a third
offense results in permanent suspension from the league. 158 Players have
the option to reapply for reinstatement after serving a two-year
suspension, at the Program Committee's discretion.' 59 The NHL also
observes a strict liability standard and does not accept lack of intent as a
defense to a PED violation. 60 However, the NHL's policy of minimal
off-season testing and its lack of blood and HGH testing have rendered
its policy extremely ineffective. 16'
Because the NHL has not had a high-profile scandal involving PED62
use, many people assume that PED use is not common in the NHL.
However, Georges Laraque, a former Montreal Canadians player, in his
autobiography, Georges Laraque: The Story of the NHL's Unlikeliest
Tough Guy, reveals the widespread use of PEDs in the NHL.163 He also
expresses his concern for player safety, since the NHL is the only league
that allows player fights.164 PED use by players is extremely dangerous,

not only because of its physical effects, but also because of its mental
154. See Brough, supra note 24 (expressing NHL player Jonathan Toews's concern over low
testing standards in the NIL).
155. See Timeline, supranote 133.
156. See Fortenberry & Hoffman, supra note 146, at 135 ("The closest thing the NHL had to a
steroid policy at the start of the steroid controversy was the NHL's Substance Abuse and Behavioral
Health Program ('SABHP') which was created in 1996. If a player voluntarily participated in that
program, he was not disciplined.").
157. See NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement 2012, supra note 23, at 190. The players are
only tested three times a year. Id. However, similar to the NBA, the NHL also has reasonable cause
testing procedures. Id. at 190-91.
158. Id.at 191-92.
159. Id. at 192.
160. Id. at 193.
161. See Sean Sarcu, Could the NHL Have a Performance Enhancing Drug Problem?,
HOCKEY WRITERS (Mar. 3, 2014), http://thehockeywriters.com/nhl-performance-enhancing-drugproblem. Washington Capitals player Nicklas Backstrom was not allowed to play the gold medal
game for Sweden during the 2014 Winter Olympics because he failed an International Olympic
Committee drug test. Id.
162. Id.
163. See LARAQUE, supra note 18, at 132-33.
164. Id. at 131-33.
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effects, such as aggression and rage.165 This illustrates166the pressing need
for a more comprehensive PED program in the NHL.
III.

GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTS TO FIX THE PROBLEM AND THE
IMPORTANCE OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION

I'm on steroids, what do you think? Who do you think I am? I'm a
baseballplayer, baseballplayers take steroids. How do you think Bonds
hits all his home runs? How do you think all these guys do all this stuff?
You think they do itfromjust working out normal?
Can
- Rob Garibaldi, Revolution in the Bleachers. How Parents
167
Take Back Family Life in a World Gone Crazy Over Youth Sports
To rid The Leagues of PEDs, government intervention is crucial, as
evidenced by the above quoted young athlete who began using steroids
at age sixteen, and eventually committed suicide at age twenty-four
because of the mental effects of steroids.1 68 It is necessary for many of
69
the same reasons that The Leagues' current policies are inadequate,
and because the effects of PEDs are no longer confined to The
Leagues. 170 Subpart A discusses how PED use is affecting society, with
an alarming trend among youth. 171 Additionally, it explores the need for
better management of the PED use issue for the players and The Leagues
themselves.1 2 Subpart B focuses on the BALCO Scandal and its
importance in the fight against PEDs. 173 Subpart C explains how, despite
congressional efforts to resolve the PED use issue in the past, Congress
has fallen short of making any significant impact. 174 Subpart D addresses
the Biogenesis Scandal and the lack of owner accountability,
further illustrating the inadequacies of the current programs. 75 Finally,

165. See id. Laraque discusses how PEDs desensitize the players, resulting in the players not
feeling pain, and thus, fighting longer and harder. Id.
166. See Kiely, supra note 144.
167. See REGAN MCMAHON, REVOLUTION IN THE BLEACHERS: How PARENTS CAN TAKE
BACK FAMILY LIFE IN A WORLD GONE CRAZY OVER YOUTH SPORTS 87 (2007) (internal quotation

marks omitted).
168. See Svrluga, supra note 29 (arguing that the recent Biogenesis Scandal is proof that
current testing in MLB is inadequate); infra Part IV (suggesting that a hybrid-agency with
government oversight is necessary to rid professional sports of PEDs).
169. See supra Part II.C.
170. See MCMAHON, supra note 167, at 86-87, 92-94 (explaining how PED use in young
athletes has become an epidemic).
171. See Calfee & Fadale, supra note 2, at e578, e581; infra Part 1I.A.
172. See infra Part III.A.
173. See infra Part llI.B.
174. See infra Part III.C.
175. See infra Part I1D.
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Subpart E provides a brief overview of the USADA and explains why it
is not a viable solution for The Leagues. 176
A.

Why Is Such Reform Necessary?

PED use in sports is a serious epidemic that is becoming more
evident as the various negative effects of PEDs are discovered. 177 While
the use of PEDs is not a recent phenomenon, it is particularly dangerous
in today's society. 178 With The Leagues being more competitive than
ever, and the pressure to perform being at an all-time high, the use of
PEDs has trickled its way down to amateur athletes in high schools and
colleges across the country. 17 9 Fueling this epidemic are all of The
Leagues' current PED programs, which lack the sophistication that can
be achieved with a unified PED policy and program. 180 Because PED use
has become an epidemic, the time to take serious action against PED use
is now; and, to make this action effective, a collaborative
effort between
8
the government and The Leagues is necessary.' '
1. Effects of Performance Enhancing Drugs on Society
PED use is no longer confined to professional sports. 82 Many high
school and college athletes use PEDs, as well. 83 In fact, as of 2006, PED
use was about eleven percent among high school males, and about three
percent among high school females. 184 Children as young as nine years
of age are using PEDs.185 Regrettably, PED use results in the deaths of
amateur athletes throughout the country. 186 The first step in preventing
these tragedies is providing governmental oversight at the professional
level. 87 Young athletes are watching their heroes and idols hit massive
176. See infra Part III.E.
177. See MCMAHON, supra note 167, at 89-90 (explaining that the effects of PEDs on youths
can be more severe than on adults); supraPart II.A.
178. See MCMAHON, supra note 167, at 88-89; see infra Part III.A.1.
179. See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text (discussing Bob Costas's view of the
competitive nature of MLB); see infra Part I1.A. 1.
180. See supra Part II.C; infra Part [V.A.
181. See infra Part III.A.1; infra Part IV.B.
182. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Crossman, Comment, Mark McGwire Does It, So Why Can'tI? High
School Student Use of Dietary Supplements and the Failure of DSHEA, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 617,
620-29 (2000) (exploring various factors that have caused an increase in the use of PEDs by amateur
athletes, such as pressure from parents and coaches, and professional athletes as role models who
use PEDs).
183. See Calfee & Fadale, supra note 2, at e578-79, e581.
184. See id. at e581.
185. See id.
186. See Brittain, supra note 80.
187. See MCMAHON, supra note 167, at 88 (noting that often when young athletes use PEDs, it
is because they hear about their role models in The Leagues using PEDs); infra Part IV.
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homeruns, tackle opposing players with brute force, make backboardshattering dunks, and take faster slap shots.188 The allure of such fame
motivates young athletes to achieve a level of performance which many
times can only be achieved through PED use.'8 9
2. Effects of Performance Enhancing Drugs on The Leagues
Government intervention will protect The Leagues' interests, as
well. 190 Currently, PED issues are resolved through an arbitration
process, and can eventually lead to litigation involving the

Commissioner or the league as a party.' 9' These arbitration hearings and
lawsuits place an unnecessary burden on The Leagues and their
respective Commissioners, as well as the courts of law.1 92 PED disputes
distract the league Commissioners from other important league matters
193
and tie up the courts with issues that can be resolved elsewhere.
Furthermore, these proceedings cause
an unnecessary rift between the
94
players and their respective leagues. 1
3. Effects of Performance Enhancing Drugs on the Players
Due to the various ways The Leagues are mishandling the PED
epidemic, players lack faith and trust in the current systems and
repeatedly question the procedures. 195 Over the past fifteen years, there
have been numerous leaks of confidential information to the media

188. See supra Part I. President George W. Bush discussed the effect of PED use in The
Leagues on young athletes: "The use of performance-enhancing drugs like steroids in baseball,
football, and other sports is dangerous, and it sends the wrong message-that there are shortcuts to
accomplishment, and that performance is more important than character." SANTO & MILDNER,
supra note 25, at 174.
189. See Calfee & Fadale, supra note 2, at e578 (arguing that the use of PEDs by professional
athletes is one of the leading causes for the growing PED use in high school and college athletes).
190. See Bryan Hoch, A-Rod Files Lawsuits Against MLB, Doctor, MLB.coM (Oct. 4, 2013),
http://losangeles.dodgers.mlb.com/news/article/nyy/alex-rodriguez-files-lawsuit-against-majorleague-baseball-commissioner-bud-selig?ymd=20131004&contentid=62459560&vkey=newsnyy
(reporting that Alex Rodriguez is suing MLB, Bud Selig, and a New York Yankees team doctor).
191. See id
192. See id; see also Matt Schiavenza, Bud Selig's Misguided, Last-Minute Push Against
Steroids in Baseball, ATLANTIC (June 13, 2013, 8:43 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/
entertainment/archive/2013/06/bud-seligs-misguided-last-minute-push-against-steroids-inbaseball/276776 (arguing that Commissioner Selig's focus is solely on PEDs and that the recent
Biogenesis Scandal has been extremely time consuming for Commissioner Selig).
193. See Hoch, supranote 190; Schiavenza, supra note 192; infra Part 1V.B.
194. See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note I11.
195. See, e.g., Hoch, supra note 190. In response to the St. Louis Cardinals signing Johnny
Peralta to a four-year, $53 million contract, Brad Zeigler, a relief pitcher for the Arizona
Diamondbacks and a Player Representative for the MLBPA, tweeted: "We thought 50 games would
be a deterrent ... Obviously, it's not. So we are working on it again." White, supra note 102. Peralta
had previously been punished by MLB for violating MLB's PED policy. Id.
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1 96
regarding the identities of players accused of violating drug policies.
PED use is an extremely sensitive and serious issue, and the
confidentiality of the entire investigation process is crucial. 97 Player
identities have been leaked before they are provided proper due

process. 198 The need for fixing this problem is evidenced by the fact that
identities of players who have ultimately been deemed "clean" have been
leaked alongside the identities of players that did in fact use PEDs.' 99
Although each league's PED policy contains a confidentiality clause,
they are seldom enforced.200 This is a serious infringement on the
players' privacy rights, who trust and allow The Leagues to collect
samples of their blood and urine, only to have that information leaked to
the media.20 '
B.

The BALCO Scandal

The BALCO Scandal 202 changed the landscape of PEDs in
professional sports forever.20 3 It brought the often underground and
overlooked PED issue to the front pages of newspapers.20 4 BALCO was
a small supplement clinic in California, owned and operated by Victor
Conte,20 5 who provided PEDs to MLB, NFL, and track and field
athletes.20 6 The federal government commenced an investigation into the
BALCO clinic in 2002, focusing the investigation on alleged money
196. See David Adelsberg, Note, Did the MLBPA Strike Out? An Analysis of Union Liability in
Major League Baseball's Anonymous 2003 Steroid Testing, 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 695,
703-04 (2011) (discussing the issue of leaked player names in the media after anonymous drug
testing); see also Perry, supra note 103 (stressing how leaked player names harm the integrity of the
Joint Drug Agreement).
197. See Adelsberg, supranote 196, at 697-700, 703-04.
198. See Perry, supra note 103.
199. See James Wagner, Nationals' Gio Gonzalez Cleared in Biogenesis Case, WASH. POST,
Aug. 5, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-08-05/sports/41093861_1_biogenesis-mlbinvestigators-gio-gonzalez (reporting that MLB pitcher Gio Gonzalez, who was initially named in
the Biogenesis Scandal, never used PEDs).
200. See, e.g., Joint Drug Agreement, supra note 23, at 26-33; NBA Collective Bargaining
Agreement, supra note 23, at 411-13; NFL Policy and Program 2014, supra note 23, at 6-8; NHL
Collective Bargaining Agreement 2012, supra note 23, at 194. But see supra notes 195-99 and
accompanying text (exploring the confidentiality issue concerning PED testing).
201. See Adelsberg, supra note 196, at 697-98, 703-04.
202. See MARK FAINARU-WADA & LANCE WILLIAMS, GAME OF SHADOWS: BARRY BONDS,
BALCO, AND THE STEROID SCANDAL THAT ROCKED PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 263 (2006). In 2003,
the BALCO Scandal exposed how prevalent PED use was in professional sports, especially through
publication of the grand jury testimony of MLB players Jason Giambi and Barry Bonds. Id.
203. See id.; McDuff& Baron, supranote 21, at 892.
204. See FAINARU-WADA & WILLIAMS, supra note 202, at 263.
205. See id at 1.
206. Id. Athletes from all different sports were linked to the BALCO Scandal, from Olympic
gold medalist Marion Jones to MLB superstar Barry Bonds. Id. at 1, 263.
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laundering and illegal drug sales.2 °7 However, the investigators quickly
discovered that many superstar athletes were clients of Conte.2 °8 Soon
after, Mark Fainaru-Wada and Lance Williams of the San Francisco
Chronicle exposed the secrets of BALCO in groundbreaking articles and
eventually through their book, Game ofShadows. Barry Bonds, BALCO,
and the Steroid Scandalthat Rocked ProfessionalSports. °9
The BALCO Scandal was the first step in uncovering the
underworld of PEDs in professional sports.2 1 ° It emphasized the
pervasive nature of PED use in The Leagues. 2 11 Although the BALCO
Scandal shed tremendous light on the PED issue, it has been more than a
decade since the scandal, and no league has since implemented a
meaningful solution to eliminate PED use.21 2
C. The ProposedActs and The Mitchell Report
After the BALCO Scandal exploded in 2003, the federal
government felt pressured to step in and repair baseball (often referred to
as "America's game").213 Although the federal government indicted
Conte, its power over MLB and its players was limited.214 In response to
this lack of power, Congress has made numerous attempts at passing
bills, to no avail.215 While Congress failed to pass adequate legislation,
bad publicity and pressure from the government and fans led
207. See ROSEN, supra note 55, at 128.
208. See id. at 129.
209. See generally FAINARU-WADA & WILLIAMS, supra note 202; Michiko Kakutani,
America's Game, America's Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2006, at El.
210. See Kakutani, supra note 209.
211. Seeid.
212. See supra Part II.C.
213. See SANTO & MILDNER, supra note 25, at 174 (describing the pressure faced by the
government and The Leagues after the BALCO Scandal).
214. See ROSEN, supra note 55, at 129-30; see also SANTO & MILDNER, supra note 25, at 176
(explaining how the acts proposed by the Senate and the House of Representatives failed to pass and
were only able to convince MLB and its players to agree to more rigorous PED testing).
215. Clean Sports Act of 2005, S. 1114, 109th Cong. (2005), available at
(proposing
to
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS- 109sl 1l4is/pdf/BILLS-109sl Il4is.pdf.
"protect the integrity of professional sports and the health and safety of athletes generally by
establishing minimum standards for the testing of steroids and other performance-enhancing
substances by professional sports leagues"); Drug Free Sports Act, H.R. 3084, 109th Cong. (2005),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS- 109hr3084rh/pdf/BILLS- 109hr3084rh.pdf.
(directing "the Secretary of Commerce to issue regulations requiring testing for steroids and other
performance-enhancing substances for certain sports associations engaged in interstate commerce");
Professional Sports Integrity and Accountability Act, S. 1334, 109th Cong. (2005), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/B1ILLS-109s1334is/pdf/BILLS-109s1334is.pdf. (making it "unlawful
for a professional sports league to organize, sponsor, endorse, promote, produce, or recognize a
professional sports event without adopting and enforcing a testing policy" that met the requirements
in the Act).
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Commissioner Selig to request former Senator George Mitchell to
investigate further into the underworld of PEDs in MLB. 2 6 After 21
months of investigation and more than 700 interviews with players,
coaches, and other league employees, Mitchell presented The Mitchell
Report.217 The Mitchell Report named 86 current and former MLB
players that were linked to the use of PEDs.al8 While some of the names
were the same as those disclosed by the BALCO Scandal, many new
names surfaced, as well.219 Mitchell urged MLB and Commissioner
Selig to enforce stricter PED regulations and to create an independent
investigation department with legal expertise to address the PED
issue. 220 The Mitchell Report led to a new Joint Drug Program, which
implemented stricter PED regulations, but, as previously mentioned, has
failed to effectively reduce PED use in MLB.221
D. The Biogenesis Scandal and Lack of Owner Accountability
The Biogenesis Scandal is a prime example of the failure of the
PED programs currently employed by The Leagues.222 The Biogenesis
Scandal-now known as the largest PED scandal in MLB historybegan in South Florida, where Anthony Bosch, owner of the Biogenesis
Clinic, began supplying PEDs to many well-known MLB players. 223 As
a result of the investigation conducted by MLB, thirteen players were
suspended for the use of PEDs, though none of the players tested
positive for PEDs.224 Bosch, during an interview with 60 Minutes,
illustrated how easy it was for him and the players to maneuver around
the current MLB testing protocol. 25 He explained that a dose of a
particular PED, ingested a few minutes before a game, would disappear
216. See ROSEN, supra note 55, at 188-89; SANTO & MILDNER, supra note 25, at 176.
217. See MITCHELL, supra note 44; ROSEN supra note 55, at 189.
218. See ROSEN, supra note 55, at 189; SANTO & MILDNER, supra note 25, at 176-77.
219. See Players Listed in the Mitchell Commission Report, ESPN (Dec. 13, 2007, 9:17 PM),
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=3153646.
220. See MITCHELL, supra note 44, at 285-90.
221. See Brian Borawski, BOB: Union and Players Agree on New Joint Drug Agreement,
HARDBALL TIMES (Apr. 16, 2008), http://www.hardballtimes.comibob-union-and-players-agree-onnew-joint-drug-agreement (reporting that MLB has adopted several recommendations from the
Mitchell Report, including an Independent Program Administrator and 600 additional tests per
year); see also supra Part I.C. 1 (highlighting the inadequacy of the current MLB Joint Drug

Program).
222.

See Svrluga, supranote 29.

223. See Steve Fishman, Chasing A-Rod, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2013, at 36, 38-39 (explaining
how the information about the suspended players leaked, and the steps taken by MLB and Alex
Rodriguez to acquire and suppress the information).
224. See Svrluga, supra note 29; see also Peltz & Bailey, supra note 24 (listing the thirteen

players that were suspended).
225.

See 60 Minutes: The Case ofAlex Rodriguez (CBS television broadcast Jan. 12, 2014).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2014

23

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 8

HOFSTRA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 43:563

from the player's system before the game ended, rendering the PED
virtually undetectable under the current programs.2 26
Even in the absence of positive test results, Alex Rodriguez and
Ryan Braun faced unprecedented suspensions. 227 Braun received a 6522 8
game suspension, while Rodriguez was given a 211-game suspension.
Both of these suspensions were longer than the 50-game suspension
prescribed, at the time, by the Joint Drug Agreement for first-time
offenders. 229 Although both players had previously been linked to using
PEDs, neither had been punished. 230 Braun, who tested positive in 2011,
escaped punishment due to a technicality-his urine sample was
mishandled; yet another example of the many shortcomings of the
current program. 231 Rodriguez, who admitted to using PEDs in 2009,
never failed a drug test under the Joint Drug Agreement.232 Therefore,
these suspensions for over 50 games appear to be arbitrary and based
entirely on the Commissioner's discretion,233 causing a lack of trust
amongst players in the current drug program.234
Rodriguez challenged his unprecedented 211-game suspension by
not only appealing through the MLB arbitration process, but also by
filing three separate lawsuits in federal court.235 Rodriguez left the
arbitration process prior to its completion, claiming that the process was
frustrated by Commissioner Selig's failure to report to the hearing and
arbitrator Fredric Horowitz's ruling that Commissioner Selig could not
be compelled to testify.236 Horowitz proceeded to rule on the incomplete
226. Id.
227. See Svrluga, supra note 29.
228. See id; see also Peltz & Bailey, supra note 24 (listing Alex Rodriguez as one of the
thirteen players to be suspended as a result of the Biogenesis Scandal).
229. See Svrluga, supra note 29.
230. See SELENA ROBERTS, A-ROD: THE MANY LivEs OF ALEX RODRIGUEZ 168 (2009);
Laaser & Fauber, supra note 130.
231. See Laaser & Fauber, supranote 130.
232. See ROBERTS, supra note 230, at 168; SANTO & MILDNER, supra note 25, at 177-78; see
also Svrluga, supra note 29 (emphasizing the fact that all of the players suspended because of the
Biogenesis Scandal did not actually test positive for PEDs).
233. See Joint Drug Agreement, supra note 23, at 40. The MLB Commissioner has complete
discretion to suspend a player upon non-analytical evidence for however many games he sees fit. Id.
The prescribed lengths of suspensions in the Joint Drug Agreement are only for failed drug tests. Id.
at 35.
234. See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 111.
235. See Hoch, supra note 190. Rodriguez accused MLB and Commissioner Selig "of
conducting a 'witch hunt' and engaging in 'tortious interference' with his contracts and business
relationships." Id. He also filed a lawsuit against New York Yankees physician Dr. Christopher
Ahmad, alleging "'careless and professional negligence' on the part of Ahmad, who is said to have
missed a superior labral tear at the left hip, 'thus allowing [Rodriguez] to further injure himself and
the necessity for additional surgeries."' Id.(alteration in original).
236. See Patrick Rishe, Blown Call: A-Rod Right to Storm Out of Appeal After ArbitratorRules
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hearing and lowered Rodriguez's suspension from 211 games to 162
games. 237 After Horowitz announced his decision, Rodriguez stated:
This is one man's decision, that was not put before a fair and
impartial jury, does not involve me having failed a single drug
test, is at odds with the facts and is inconsistent with the terms of
the Joint Drug Agreement and the Basic Agreement, and relies
on testimony and documents that would never have been
allowed in any court in the United States because they are false
and wholly unreliable.238
This failed arbitration further highlights the flaws of the current Joint
Drug Agreement and the lack of proper due process for the players.239
Under the current program, there is little deterrence against the use
of PEDs-Johnny Peralta, who was suspended for 50 games for
violating the PED policy, returned to play and was rewarded with a $53
million contract, 240 resulting in outrage from many players in MLB who
called for stricter policies that would eliminate the incentive to use
PEDs. 24I This illustrates the growing sentiment among players that, in
order to cure the competitive imbalance created by PED use, they should
not begin using PEDs themselves, but rather, try to ensure none of their
competitors use PEDs.242 Likewise, there is little deterrence for owners
to sign possible PED users, since the owners are relieved from paying
the suspended player's salary while the player serves his suspension.243
When an owner awards a PED user a $53 million contract after his
suspension, it is quite apparent that there is a huge incentive for players
for No-Show Selig, FORBES (Nov. 22, 2013, 6:52 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/prishe/
2013/11/22/hey-a-rod-this-bud-isnt-for-you-as-independent-arbitrator-horowitz-makes-foul-cal
(reporting that Rodriguez left the arbitration unfinished).
237. See Greenberg, supra note 111.
238. See id,
239. See id; see also Rishe, supra note 236 (explaining that the arbitrator ruled that
Commissioner Selig did not have to testify in person at the arbitration hearing).
240. See White, supra note 102.
241. See id.
242. See, e.g., Brough, supra note 24; IBTimes Staff Reporter, supra note 144; White, supra
note 102.
243. See FAINARU-WADA & WILLIAMS, supra note 202, at 77. In their book, Mark FainaruWada and Lance Williams write that when they began breaking news about BALCO and Barry
Bonds's trainer Greg Anderson-who was also rumored to be a PED dealer linked to BALCO-the
San Francisco Giants' ownership refused to take any action and continued to allow Anderson access
to the clubhouse. Id. Such a lack of concern from the owners continues to be a problem. White,
supra note 102; see Paul White, Buck Showalter Steamed at Yanks'Possible A-Rod Windfall, USA
TODAY (July 31, 2013, 9:07 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/mlb/2013/07/3 I/buck(reporting that Baltimore Orioles'
showalter-alex-rodriguez-lifetime-ban-biogenesis/2606313
manager Buck Showalter was angry at the fact that Rodriguez's suspension will allow the New
York Yankees to use the money they saved from his contract to sign other players).
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to use PEDs, and little deterrence for owners against awarding PED
users such lucrative contracts.244
E. United States Anti-Doping Agency
Until now, one of the most successful interventions of the
government into the PED world has been the formation of the
USADA. 2 45 The USADA was created in 2000 after President Bill
Clinton formed the White House Task Force on Drug Use in Sports.246
The USADA was designed to regulate the use of PEDs in the
Olympics after U.S. athletes were accused of, and criticized for, the use
of PEDs.247 President Clinton expressed the seriousness of the steroid
issue in an executive order by stating: "The use of drugs in sports has
reached a level that endangers not just the legitimacy of athletic
competition but also the
lives and health of athletes-from the elite
248
ranks to youth leagues.

The USADA is a non-governmental agency that operates under
Colorado law, and is primarily funded by the federal government. 249 The
USADA is comprised of five board members who are elected from
outside the Olympic system, and five board members who are elected
from a pool of former Olympic athletes.25 0 The USADA enforces the
same guidelines as the World Anti-Doping Agency ("WADA"), which
oversees "doping ',,25122in international sporting events.252 Under the
USADA, any athlete planning to participate in an international event is
subject to random drug testing at any time. 21' After an athlete fails a drug
test, the results are submitted to the Anti-Doping Review Board, which
is comprised of three to five medical, technical, and legal experts, for
244. See Ted Berg, If MLB Is Serious About Stopping Steroids, Teams Should Be Punished
Too, USA TODAY (Nov. 21, 2013, 11:47 AM), http://ftw.usatoday.com/2013/1 1/alex-rodriguezyankees-peds-steroids-mlb-sanctions (proposing that to stop PED use, it is essential that the owners
should be subject to some kind of sanctions); see also White, supra note 102 (relaying the player
outrage regarding the contract awarded to Peralta by the St. Louis Cardinals).
245. See USADA 's Anti-DopingPrograms,supra note 47.
246. See Exec. Order No. 13165, 3 C.F.R. § 100-02 (2001).
247. See Sarah L. Horvitz et al., Dopers Are Not Duped: USADA 's Assistance to Federal
Prosecutions Ultimately Protecting Clean Athletes Is Not State Action, 19 MARQ. SPORTS L. REv.
39, 43-44 (2008) (addressing the purpose of the USADA).
248. See 3 C.F.R. § 100-02.
249. See Horvitz, supra note 247, at 44-45.
250. See id. at 45.
251. Doping, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/doping (last
visited Feb. 15, 2015) ("[T]he use of a substance (as an anabolic steroid or erythropoietin) or
technique (as blood doping) to illegally improve athletic performance.").
252. See Horvitz, supra note 247, at 59; World Anti-Doping Agency, World Anti-Doping Code
11-13 (2009), availableat http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/code-v2009_En.pdf.
253. See Horvitz, supra note 247, at 45-46.
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58

final review. 254 If the athlete is found guilty, he may appeal to an
arbitration tribunal whose decision is final, with no option to appeal to
federal court.255 Consequences of a violation include disqualification
from a particular event, forfeiture of medals, fines, and ineligibility to
compete for a certain period of time. 56
In 2005, Senator John McCain recommended the USADA as an
option for The Leagues. 25 7 Although the USADA is one of the better,
more successful models of an anti-doping agency, it is not the best
solution for The Leagues. 218 Despite MLB and the NFL having paired up
with the USADA and the United States Olympic Committee to create the
Partnership for Clean Competition259--an organization that conducts
PED research-they have refused to adopt the USADA as their primary
testing agency.26° The lack of player representation and the significant
differences between the Olympics and The Leagues, are two possible
reasons why The Leagues have opposed the USADA's involvement.2 61
The Leagues require a more specialized agency, tailored to the unique
models of The Leagues.262
IV.

THE CONTRACT AND THE HYBRID-AGENCY

The Leagues have all attempted different methods to combat PED
use. 2 6 3 However, as past and present controversies have shown, The
Leagues have failed to rid themselves of the PED issue. 264 The negative
effects of PEDs, which were once contained within The Leagues, have

254. See id. at 46-47.
255. See id. at 47.
256. See Athlete Handbook, U.S. ANTI-DOPING AGENCY 33 (2014), http://www.usada.org/
uploads/athletehandbook.pdf.
257. See Thomas Heath, McCain Wants USADA to Test Major Sports, WASH. POST, May 25,
2005, at D2 (explaining Senator John McCain's proposal to The Leagues to adopt the USADA as
their PED program).
258. See Stewart, supra note 48, at 232-36 (criticizing the USADA for binding athletes to
arbitration as the only avenue to challenge a sanction). In order to enforce a lifetime ban in The
Leagues, it is crucial that players are afforded proper due process, including an opportunity to
appeal to the courts. Id.
259. See About, PARTNERSHIP FOR CLEAN COMPETITION, http://www.cleancompetition.org/
pages/about.aspx (last visited Feb. 15, 2015).
260. See John Helyar, Can MLB, NFL and USADA All Get Along in Anti-Doping Coalition?,
ESPN (Jan. 11, 2008, 3:23 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/columns/story?id=3191684 (noting
the continuous refusal of MLB and the NFL to allow the USADA to control their drug programs).
261. See Stewart, supra note 48, at 228-37 (expressing how athletes' rights are lost in the
USADA process).
262. See infra Part 1V.B.
263. See supra Part II.C.
264. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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spread into society.26 5 It is time that The Leagues stop resisting
government intervention and team up with the government to establish a
working solution.266 Subpart A argues that the most effective way to rid
The Leagues and society of PEDs is to adopt a zero-tolerance policy,
backed by a contractual agreement between the government and The
Leagues, and to establish a hybrid-agency to enforce the zero-tolerance
policy.

267

Subpart B examines the make-up of the hybrid-agency and

explains why a proper appeals process is necessary, and how that goal is
to be accomplished.2 68 Subpart C addresses the constitutional challenges
that the hybrid-agency will face. 269 Finally, Subpart D concludes by
explaining how this solution will appeal to all parties involved, and why
this is an effective solution.2 7 °
A.

Zero-Tolerance Policy

Current systems do little to deter players from using PEDs. 271
However, a zero-tolerance policy will leave little incentive for players to
use PEDs.272 For players, an 80-game suspension in MLB, or a 4-game
suspension in the NFL, is a risk worth taking if it means a chance to play
in The Leagues and the opportunity to sign a multi-million dollar
contract.273 The choice between not being able to play and taking a
chance with PEDs-which will only result in a short suspension-is
obvious for many players. 274 Therefore, a zero-tolerance policy will
significantly reduce, if not eliminate, the incentive to use PEDs.275
While it is important to deter players from using PEDs, it is equally
important to disincentivize owners from knowingly signing former PED
users to multi-million dollar contracts.2 76 These types of contracts given
to known PED users further encourage PED use by players.277 A major
265. See Calfee & Fadale, supranote 2, at e581.
266. Cf Heath, supra note 257 (discussing Senator McCain's attempt to involve the
government in PED testing in professional sports).
267.

See infra Part IV.A.

268. See infra Part V.B.
269. See infra Part IV.C.
270. See infra Part IV.D.
271. See White, supra note 102. Even after being suspended for PED use, the St. Louis
Cardinals signed Johnny Peralta to a $53 million contract. Id.
272. See Seidel, supra note 49. A zero-tolerance policy will impose a lifetime ban from the
sport on any violators of the policy. Id.
273. See id. The Biogenesis Scandal has proven that the current programs are inadequate to
deter players from using PEDs. White, supra note 102.
274. See White, supranote 102.
275. See supranotes 271-74 and accompanying text.
276. See Berg, supra note 244; see also TUOHY, supra note 19, at 186, 190.
277. See Crossman, supra note 182, at 622-26 (arguing that high profile athletes, such as Mark
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issue throughout the PED era has been the lack of penalties against
owners for their players' behavior.2 78 Although the owners cannot be
held responsible for everything their players do, the owners must play a
larger role in PED prevention by performing their due diligence with
respect to PED use by their players and in their locker rooms.2 79 Unlike
the current PED programs, under a zero-tolerance policy the owners will
not be completely relieved of the banned player's contract. 280 Rather, as
part of the contract signed between The Leagues and the government, the
owner will have to pay the average annual value281 of the banned
player's contract to the hybrid-agency in order to fund its operations.282
This will force the owners to be more vigilant about the use of PEDs by
their players, and much more cautious when signing players to multimillion dollar contracts.283
Along with the money from the suspended contracts, The Leagues
themselves will fund the hybrid-agency.2 84 Currently, each league funds
its own individual PED program.285 However, a joint program will allow
each league to spend less, while having a better, more comprehensive
program in place.286 This, in effect, will generate an incentive for The
Leagues to participate in the joint program and create a quasi-subsidy for
287
The Leagues, since it will cost each league less individually.
McGwire, influence other players and young athletes to use PEDs).
278. See supra notes 243-44 and accompanying text; see also TUOHY, supra note 19, at 186,
190 (condemning MLB owners turning a blind eye to PED use in their locker rooms).
279. See Berg, supra note 244; see also TUOHY, supra note 19, at 186, 190 (reporting that
owners had warnings of PED use "well before the steroid issue exploded on the front pages of
newspapers").
280. See White, supra note 243.
281. Gordon Edes, The ABCs of AA Vs, ESPN (Mar. 6, 2013, 9:23 AM), http://espn.go.com/
blogfbostonlred-sox/post/_/id/25345/the-abcs-of-aavs. The average annual value of a contract is
determined by dividing the total amount of the player's contract with the length of years of the
contract. Id.
282. See White, supra note 243.
283. See White, supra note 102. Currently, owners can sign prior PED users to multi-million
dollar contracts knowing that if the player is suspended again, they will not have to pay the player,
and the team will be able to spend that money for another player. White, supra note 243. This
eliminates any risk for the owners in signing and rewarding PED users. Id.
284. See Michael McCann, Is the Government Wasting Tax Dollars on Roger Clemens'
Trials?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (May 1, 2012), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2012/writers/
michaelmccann/05/01/clemens.trial (reporting that people believe the government is wasting useful
resources in pursuing the prevention of PED use in sports). This solution will receive widespread
acceptance since the hybrid-agency will not require taxpayer money. Id.
285. See supra Part II.C.
286. See Paul Morosi, Messy Realities of A-Rod Investigation Might Cost MLB Later, Fox
SPORTS (May 28, 2014, 6:20 PM), http://msn.foxsports.com/mlb/story/alex-rodriguez-investigationmessy-realities-mlbpa-could-cause-labor-problems-later-011214 (noting the large amount of time
and money MLB spent during the Biogenesis investigation).
287. See id. It will cost each individual league less to maintain a unified program as opposed to
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Therefore, despite the government's role in the program, there will be no
added burden on taxpayers.28 8
B.

The Hybrid-Agency

The hybrid-agency 28 9 will have a similar structure to the National
Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"), consisting of a seven-member Board
("Board"), divisional judges, and investigators. 290 Upon a possible failed
drug test, investigators will seek to confirm the test results and gather
other evidence to help strengthen their case.29 1 Once the investigators
confirm the failed drug test, a hearing will be held in front of an
Administrative Law Judge ("AL"). 292 The ALJ will adjudicate the
matter by considering the test results, other proof against the player, and
the evidence presented by the player.293 If the ALJ finds clear and
convincing evidence of the player's guilt, only then will the player be
banned.294 During the hearing before the ALJ, both the player and the
investigator will be allowed to present evidence in accordance with the
Federal Rules of Evidence. 295 If the player or the hybrid-agency disputes
the ruling, or the process, either party may appeal to the Board.296 After
the Board makes its decision, the player or the hybrid-agency
maintaining their own separate programs. Helyar, supra note 260 (reporting that a combined venture
between MLB, the NFL, and the USADA plans to raise $10 million in the next four years). This is
an example of how successful and effective a joint venture between The Leagues can be. Id.
288. See McCann, supra note 284. Many believe that the resources used by the government
during Roger Clemens' trial were a wasteful use of taxpayer dollars. Id.
289. See KOSAR, supra note 50, at 2 (discussing quasi-governmental agencies).
290. See Who We Are, NAT'L LAB. REL. BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are (last visited
Feb. 15, 2015) (mentioning that the NLRB consists of a five-member Board, which acts as a quasijudicial body, the General Counsel, and the Division of Judges).
291. Cf id. The investigators will work from field offices located in each major city where
there is a professional sports team.
292. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 51 (9th ed. 2009) ("Administrative Law Judge: An
official who presides at an administrative hearing and who has the power to administer oaths, take
testimony, rule on questions of evidence, and make factual and legal determinations.").
293. Cf Division of Judges, NAT'L LAB. REL. BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/who-weare/division-judges (last visited Feb. 15, 2015).
294. See Stewart, supra note 48, at 231-32 (describing how USADA's "comfortable
satisfaction" standard has rendered players so afraid that they even refrain from eating at restaurants
in fear of unintentional doping). Therefore, it is crucial that a standard such as clear and convincing
evidence be used. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 636 (9th ed. 2009) (Clear and convincing evidence is
defined as: "Evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably
certain.").
295. See FED. R. EVID. One of the biggest issues Rodriguez had with the arbitration process
was the lack of evidentiary rules. Greenberg, supra note I11.
296. Cf Unfair Labor PracticeProcess Chart,NAT'L LAB. REL. BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/
resources/nlrb-process/unfair-labor-practice-process-chartprocess (last visited Feb. 15, 2015). In the
NLRB, after the ALJ makes a decision, the Board has the final say to approve the decision or review
it further. Id.
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may further appeal to federal court.297 However, an appeal to a federal
court will only be allowed once all other administrative remedies have
been exhausted.2 98
A player facing a lifetime ban must have the option to appeal a
decision of the Board, whether the player believes the decision is
incorrect, or the player is unsatisfied with the process.2 99 With the
hybrid-agency, the standard of review will be similar to that of an appeal
from a federal agency decision. 300 This will provide proper due process
to the players by allowing them to have their case heard in court without
any preconceived notions or biases.30 ' Currently, a player's only
practical form of recourse is arbitration; however, as evidenced by
various court decisions,30 2 it is extremely difficult to vacate an arbitration
award, rendering an appeal of an arbitration decision virtually
meaningless.30 3 With the new hybrid-agency, the court will not be
constrained to the restrictive high standard for vacating arbitration
decisions. 3°4 Although some deference will be given to the hybridagency due to its perceived expertise,30 5 the court will be able to examine
cases de novo. 306
297. See, e.g., NLRB. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 161 F.3d 953, 960-61 (6th Cir. 1998). All NLRB
decisions are appealable to federal court. Id.
298. Cf Unfair Labor PracticeProcess Chart, supra note 296. In the NLRB, a Board decision
can be reviewed by a court of appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court can review appeals from the
court of appeals. Id.
299. See, e.g., FluorDaniel, Inc., 161 F.3d at 960-61.
300. See id. at 961. The court reviewed the Board's decision de novo. Id.
301. See Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001)
("[E]stablished law ordinarily precludes a court from resolving the merits of the parties' dispute on
the basis of its own factual determinations, no matter how erroneous the arbitrator's decision.");
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 575 (9th ed. 2009) ("[D]ue [P]rocess: The conduct of private rights,
including notice and the right to a fair hearing before a tribunal with the power to decide the case.").
302. See, e.g., Garvey, 532 U.S. at 509 ("When an arbitrator resolves disputes regarding the
application of a contract, and no dishonesty is alleged, the arbitrator's 'improvident, even silly,
factfinding' does not provide a basis for a reviewing court to refuse to enforce the award."); E.
Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57, 62 (2000) (holding
that even if the court finds that the arbitrator committed a serious error, the court may not overturn
the arbitrator's decision); United Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29,
38 (1987) ("[A] court should not reject an award on the ground that the arbitrator misread the
contract."); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960)
("[T]he question of interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement is a question for the
arbitrator.").
303. See Garvey, 532 U.S. at 509 ("We recently reiterated that if an 'arbitrator is even arguably
construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority,' the fact that 'a
court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision."').
304. See id.
305. See Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984)
(requiring courts to defer to statutory interpretations made by government agencies charged with
enforcing the statutes unless the interpretations are unreasonable).
306. See Fluor Daniel, Inc., 161 F.3d at 961; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 500 (9th ed. 2009)
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The hybrid-agency's adjudication structure will be composed of a
Commissioners'
Committee, comprised of the four League
Commissioners, which will appoint the ALJs, °7 and the Board, which
will consist of seven members. °8 The Players' Associations Presidents
will elect two of the Board members; an Owners' Committee, consisting
of owners' representatives from each league, will elect two members;
and, the President of the United States will appoint the remaining three
members. 30 9 The Board members will serve three-year terms. 310 This
structure will allow each interested party to have input in the process.3 1'
After the three-year appointments, the progress of the hybridagency will be reevaluated and a new contract between the government
and The Leagues will be negotiated. 31 2 These short-term contracts will
encourage The Leagues to feel comfortable with this new arrangement,
and allow frequent evaluations of the program. 313 The hybrid-agency
will be required to release annual progress reports illustrating its
effectiveness to the U.S. President and The Leagues.3 14 After the three("de novo: Anew"); see also Stewart, supra note 48, at 232-36 (arguing that the arbitration process
USADA utilizes is not sufficient and can result in the violation of the athletes' due process rights).
307. See Divisionof Judges, supra note 293. The NLRB has a similar make-up to a Division of
Judges who "docket, hear, settle and decide unfair labor practice cases nationwide." Id.
308. See The Board, NAT'L LAB. REL. BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/board (last
visited Feb. 15, 2015). The NLRB consists of five board members. Id
309. See KOSAR, supra note 50, at 1 (explaining the benefits of hybrid-agencies, such as
flexibility and freedom from restrictive laws that traditional government agencies need to follow).
Having only three government representatives will allow the hybrid-agency to function with
minimal governmental interference. Id.
310. Cf Todd A. Curry & Mark S. Hurwitz, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science Association: Does Accountability Vary? Examining the Tenure of State Supreme
Court Justices 7-8 (Sept. 2-5, 2010) (concluding shorter terms increase accountability). Every three
years, a new Board will be elected. These shorter terms, compared to five-year terms of the NLRB
Board, will allow more accountability and fluidity. Id.
311. See supra notes 307-10 and accompanying text. Since each league will be represented
equally, no one league will receive different or unfair treatment. Diversity on Boards, NAT'L
COUNCIL OF NONPROFITS, http://www.councilofnonprofits.org/resources/resources-topic/boardsand-governance/diversity-boards (last visited Feb. 15, 2015) (explaining the benefits of a diverse
board). Additionally, since players will select two of the representatives, this will allow the players
to have a say and not leave decisions in the hands of Commissioners and arbitrators. History of the
Major League Baseball Players Association, supra note 106 (reviewing the history of collective
bargaining in MLB). Furthermore, the Board members selected by the President will keep a check
on not allowing the players to get too much power. See KOSAR, supra note 50, at 1 (explaining how
a hybrid-agency allows for more freedom, as it is not bound by restrictive laws).
312. See, e.g., Basic Agreement, supra note 110, at 1.
313. See, e.g., id. The short terms allow MLB and the MLBPA to renegotiate after every four
years. Id.
314. See Annual Report, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/answers/
annrep.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2015). The hybrid-agency will be required to file an annual report,
similar to a Form 10-K required by the Securities and Exchange Commission, disclosing the
progress of the hybrid-agency in the prior year. Id.
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year period, the testing procedures, frequency of testing, and other
changing aspects of the program, will be renegotiated, while the banned
substance list will constantly be updated.3 1 5 This will allow for a fluent
policy that can adapt to the ever-changing world of PEDs.3 16 The
negotiations will be similar to the current collective bargaining
negotiations-which create league agreements-and will consist of
Players' Association Presidents, the Owners' Committee, and Presidentappointed government representatives.3 17 During negotiations, the
Players' Association Presidents and the Owners' Committee will
negotiate as usual, and the government representatives will work as the
arbiters.318 The impartial government representatives will help prevent
any league biases, lockouts, or strikes, and will help keep the procedures
fair.3 19 The Players' Association Presidents and the Owners' Committee
will attempt to come to an agreement, but if they reach an impasse in the
negotiations, the government representatives will then make a decision,
taking the arguments of both sides into account. 32 0 The diversity of the
group will serve as a check, so no one side becomes too powerful, and
the Players' Associations participation will allow the players to maintain
a level of control over the process, which is crucial when levying serious
penalties that impact players' rights and livelihoods.3 2'
315. See Mark Maske, HGH Testing of NFL Players to Begin this Month;
Welker and Scandrick Eligible to Play Immediately, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2014,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/sports/wp/2014/09/17/hgh-testing-of-nfl-players-to-beginthis-month-welker-and-scandrick-eligible-to-play-immediately (reporting that the NFL and the
NFLPA negotiated new terms for their Substance Abuse Program). The negotiations will be similar
to the collective bargaining negotiations in The Leagues. See History of the Major League Baseball
PlayersAssociation, supra note 106.
316. See 60 Minutes: The Case of Alex Rodriguez, supra note 225 (interviewing Anthony
Bosch, the owner of the Biogenesis Clinic). In the interview, Bosch detailed the intricate program he
tailored for Rodriquez and the state of the art supplements Rodriquez used. Id.
317. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 299 (9th ed. 2009) ("[C]ollective [B]argaining:
Negotiations between an employer and the representatives of organized employees to determine the
conditions of employment, such as wages, hours, discipline, and fringe benefits."); Maske, supra
note 315 (explaining the NFL's and the NFLPA's negotiations).
318. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 119 (9th ed. 2009) ("[A]rbiter: One with the power to
decide disputes, such as a judge."); Gary Huckabay & Greg Pappas, Labor Negotiations. What
Happens Next?, ESPN (July 23, 2002), http://a.espncdn.com/mlb/columns/bp/1408976.html
(explaining the negotiations process between MLB and the MLBPA, and how the NLRB can act as
a mediator in case of an impasse).
319. See Huckabay & Pappas, supra note 318. The impartial government representatives will
act as an internal NLRB, who can resolve disputes and impasses internally. ProSports Lockouts and
Strikes Fast Facts, CNN (July 28, 2014, 5:12 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/03/us/pro-sportslockouts-and-strikes-fast-facts (reporting the long history of lockouts and strikes in The Leagues).
320. See Huckabay & Pappas, supranote 318 (recognizing that the NLRB currently performs a
similar role for MLB).
321. See id. Instead of having an outside agency like the NLRB resolve issues, the government
representatives will be able to resolve such issues internally. Id.; see also supra notes 309-17 and
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ConstitutionalChallengesFaced by the Hybrid-Agency

The hybrid-agency and all its powers and functions will be
constitutional. 322 Although the Fourth Amendment 323 bars a government
entity from collecting blood or urine samples from the players working
for a private entity, this restriction will not apply here.32 4 Because the
of
only
represent
a
minority
government
will
the Board, and will not fund the hybrid-agency, the hybrid-agency
will not be deemed a federal agency.325 Therefore, the Fourth
Amendment, which only applies to government action, will not apply to
the hybrid-agency.3 26
Government intervention into the private sector has often been
frowned upon.327 However, because MLB is largely exempt from the
Sherman Anti-Trust Laws,328 the government has a heightened
responsibility to regulate the league for the players involved.32 9 If an
athlete decides to play baseball at the highest level in this country, he
must play in MLB. 330 It is important that where the government has
given MLB such an advantage-to operate without any competition-it
must regulate it to ensure these players are not unfairly banned from the
only avenue they have to use their unique skills to earn a living. 331 The
accompanying text (emphasizing player representation in the hybrid-agency).
322. See KOSAR, supra note 50, at 6. The hybrid agency will be characterized as a quasigovernmental agency, and will be able to exist in "the twilight zone" among many other legal quasigovernmental agencies. Id.
323. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause .... ").
324. See Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 398-400 (1995) (holding that
Amtrak was a governmental entity for First Amendment purposes because the government held the
authority to appoint majority of its board of directors).
325. See id. at 390-91. The Court held that Communications Satellite Corporation was not a
governmental entity because the President appointed only a minority of its directors. Id.
326. See Petersen v. City of Mesa, 83 P.3d 35, 43 (Ariz. 2004) (holding that random drug
testing of firefighters violated the Fourth Amendment).
327. See Allen B. West, Why ObamacareIs Badfor America's Health, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 23,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/mar/23/why-obamacare-is-bad-for-americas2012,
health/?page=all (questioning government intervention in healthcare).
328. See Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). The Sherman Anti-Trust Act prohibits
trusts and conspiracies, in restraint of trade or commerce. Id.; Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore v.
Nat'l League of Prof I Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1922) (holding that MLB is exempt
from the Sherman Anti-Trust Act). But see Curt Flood Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2012)
(limiting MLB's anti-trust exemption).
329. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 284-85 (1972) (upholding MLB's anti-trust exemption).
The anti-trust exemption allows MLB to exist without any competition from another baseball
league, along with other benefits. Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 356-57 (1953).
330. See supra notes 328-29 and accompanying text.
331. See Government as the PrimaryProtectorof Our Rights and Liberties, GOV'T Is GOOD,
http://www.govemmentisgood.com/articles.php?aid=19&p=l (last visited Feb. 15, 2015) (arguing
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NFL's tax exemption is another example of the benefits the government
has provided The Leagues, further justifying government intervention.332
Moreover, although the NBA and the NHL do not have the anti-trust
exemption like MLB, or a tax exemption like the NFL, there is still a
need for the government to regulate The Leagues' dealings with its
respective players, as each league is the only avenue for the athletes to
play the particular sport at the highest level in this country.333 Therefore,
government intervention 334into The Leagues is reasonable, and The
Leagues should respect it.
Some might question the constitutionality of the government
contracting with The Leagues and intervening in this particular private
industry. 33 5 However, because the use of PEDs has spread into American
society, the government must intervene and protect its citizens.336 The
government not only has the power to protect its citizens in any way it
sees fit, but it also has the duty to do SO. 3 37 Additionally, the government
has previously contracted with private parties to perform traditional
governmental functions-its agreements with private correctional
facilities are one such example.338 USADA is another example of a
government-funded private entity, regulating and adjudicating similar
matters as the proposed hybrid-agency. 339 The balance of power between
private parties and the government is essential for this proposed solution
that a democratic government is in the best position to protect the citizens' rights).
332. See The NFL: Big Business with Big Tax Breaks, NPR (Jan. 18, 2014, 5:00 PM),
http://www.npr.org/2014/01/18/263767372/the-nfl-big-business-with-big-tax-breaks (explaining the
tax-exempt status of the NFL).
333. See Monte Burke, Average Player Salaries in the Four Major American Sports Leagues,
FORBES (Dec. 7, 2012, 3:29 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/monteburke/2012/12/07/averageplayer-salaries-in-the-four-major-american-sports-leagues. To play at the highest level in a
particular sport, the players have to adhere to the rules of that particular league. See, e.g., MAJOR
LEAGUE CONSTITUTION, supra note 104 (stating the rules and regulations of MLB).
334. See, e.g., Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore v. Nat'l League of Prof'1 Baseball Clubs, 259
U.S. 200, 208-09 (1922); The NFL: Big Business with Big Tax Breaks, supra note 332.
335. See, e.g., Horvitz et al., supra note 247, at 44-45 (explaining how similar work is
performed by the USADA, which is deemed a private organization).
336. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
337. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States."); see, e.g., National Minimum Drinking Age Act, 23 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(1)(A) (2012) (implementing the regulation of the minimum drinking age for the safety of
citizens).
338. See Learn About Us and Our Role in Corrections, CORRECTIONS CORP. AM.,
http://cca.com/about-cca (last visited Feb. 15, 2015) (noting that the Correction Corporation of
America "designs, builds, manages and operates prisons, jails, detention centers and residential
reentry centers on behalf of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
the United States Marshals Service").
339. See Horvitz et al., supra note 247, at 44-45.
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to be widely accepted and implemented. 340 As previously mentioned,
limited government intervention is necessary and constitutional. 34'
The current system has violated many players' rights, such as their
right to privacy, and is not capable of protecting their legal rights in the
future.342 From players' confidential information being leaked, to players
not receiving proper due process before being suspended, players have
suffered repeatedly because of the shortcomings of The Leagues' current
drug policies.343 These player rights have been continuously disregarded
in the PED investigation and punishment process. 344 Therefore,
government expertise and support is crucial in handling the PED
issue, as the government is most adept at protecting the citizens'
constitutional rights.345
D. Why the ProposedSolution Will Succeed Where Others Have Failed
This solution will succeed, while many others have failed, because
this solution will appeal to all parties involved.346 First, unlike previously
proposed legislation, this contractual agreement, when collectively
bargained on, will appear similar to the current programs in The
Leagues. 347 Second, unlike the USADA, this hybrid-agency will be
geared specifically towards The Leagues.348 Third, unlike the current
programs in The Leagues, this proposed zero-tolerance policy will
eliminate any incentive players might have to use PEDs. 349 Finally, this
hybrid-agency will allow the players and The Leagues to remain in
control, while maintaining limited governmental oversight. 35" This
340. See Axisa, supra note 105. Leaving all the power in the Commissioner's hands has led
players to question the system. Id.
341. See supra notes 322-40 and accompanying text.
342. See Adelsberg, supra note 196, at 703-04; see also Perry, supra note 103 (criticizing the
player name leaks during the recent Biogenesis Scandal).
343.

See supra Part III.A.3.

344. See Adelsberg, supra note 196, at 703-04 (explaining that, in 2003, MLB players only
agreed to steroid testing once they were given the assurance that the tests would be anonymous;
however, eventually, the names of the players who tested positive were leaked); see also Perry,
supra note 103 (condemning the release of the MLB player names in the media during the
Biogenesis investigation).
345.

See Government as the Primary Protector of Our Rights and Liberties, supra note 331

(explaining that it is the government's responsibility to protect its citizens); see also Adelsberg,
supra note 196, at 697-700 (discussing leaked player names during the BALCO investigation in
2003); Perry, supra note 103 (reporting leaked MLB player names during the Biogenesis

investigation in 2013).
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.

See supra Part V.B.
See supra notes 317-21 and accompanying text.
See USADA 's Anti-Doping Programs,supra note 47; supra Part III.E.
See Berg, supranote 244; White, supra note 102.
See supra Part IV.B.
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unified zero-tolerance policy and the hybrid-agency will not only reduce
PED use in The Leagues, but it will also help reduce the use of PEDs in
extremely vulnerable young athletes.35' Impressionable young athletes
idolize the professional athletes and follow their example.352 Eliminating
PED use at the professional level will convince young athletes that they
can reach their goals without the help of PEDs.353
V.

CONCLUSION

What once was an issue contained within The Leagues has now
permeated into our society.354 PED use is an epidemic that has seen
immense growth in recent years, 355 and it comes with various health
risks, which can result in death.356 To remediate the widespread use of
PEDs, government intervention is necessary.357 Since the use of PEDs in
The Leagues has led amateur athletes to follow in the footsteps of their
heroes,358 the first step in eradicating PED use is to tackle the problem at
the professional level. 359 Despite the Leagues' various efforts, they have
failed to eliminate PED use.3 60 With the mindset of players and The
Leagues changing, now is the time to implement such a unified policy
throughout The Leagues. 36 1 A zero-tolerance policy backed by a hybridagency will be a homerun against PED use.362
Bilal Chaudry*

351. See MCMAHON, supranote 167, at 87; supra Part III.A. 1.
352. See Crossman, supra note 182, at 622-26; McMahon, supranote 167, at 88.
353. See Crossman, supranote 182, at 622-26; McMahon, supranote 167, at 88.
354. See supraPart Il.A. 1.
355. See Calfee & Fadale, supra note 2, at e581; Crossman, supranote 182, at 617-18.
356. See Brittain, supranote 80.
357. See supraPart lII.A.
358. See Brittain, supranote 80.
359. See supraPart IV.A-B.
360. See supraPart H.C.
361. See White, supranote 102.
362. See supraPart IV.
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